THE NEW REPUBLIC

The Mind of John F. Kennedy



Frederic W. Collins

May 8, 1961,

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

One in Five

★ Walter Lippmann visited Khrushchev just before the Cuban invasion and found him confident that social inequality would produce Communism in underdeveloped countries. It was useless to argue, Lippmann reported. Mr. K believed in predestination as firmly as John Knox. The Soviet government has a "relentless determination to foster the revolutionary movement," Lippmann reported.

Look around the world in the wake of Cuba and try to estimate which nation is on the side of history, the USA or the USSR.

Take Latin America, for instance. It approaches 200 million people, largely ill-clothed and ill-fed, with one of the highest birthrates in the world and population that will double in 25 years. The ardently anti-Communist Catholic Church rejects birth control.

In Latin America the poor still grow poorer, says *The Economist.* In a new survey the magazine finds that in Chile 3 percent of the landlords hold 37 percent of the cultivable land; in Brazil two-thirds of the population live at subsistence level and one child in five dies before it is a year old. Can there be doubt that a social revolution impends? The only question is whether it will be gradual or violent. Now Castro has pushed the clock ahead; he has expropriated the rich, given land to the poor, broken barriers against trade with Communist countries and made the gringos look ridiculous.

The United States is aware of these things. The most capitalistic and conventional big nation on earth is genuinely trying to promote reforms not only in Latin America but in Laos, in the Congo, round the world. Our goodwill can hardly be questioned. We are eagerly, desperately bent on keeping the revolution gradualist. But does our outlook permit success?

Look around the United States and ask that question. We bow down to the sacredness of private property and yet almost certainly an adequate social revolution in Latin America must stand private property on its head. With almost religious fervor we believe that big government is bad and yet only the strongest kind of central government can probably tax the rich and distribute the land. It is laughable to think of medical aid for the aged under social security being denounced in the US as "radical" and "socialistic" when we must countenance so much more extreme measures in underdeveloped countries if the upcoming revolution is to be kept gradualist.

Take the Cuban invasion. The CIA did not plot a genuine social revolution, it excluded radicals, put the expropriated property-owners and some Batista followers in command; nowhere that this column could discover did it show an understanding of Castro's grip on the landless peasants, or why he has it. This is true of Laos, also. Our betters expect the great unwashed to arise for the International Monetary Fund.

Has Kennedy learned from this? We don't know. His Administration is like the shiny new car which the family guards tremulously against the first scratch. The inevitable happens. The Administration car has not only got its first scratch; the whole side is bashed in. Quick replacement work will do wonders but the aura of polished virginity is gone for good.

Another Try?

★ The great thing now is whether Kennedy will be pushed in deeper by irritation over the first failure. The temptation is great. We can imagine Khrushchev hugging himself in the Kremlin in the hope that we will dissipate our military strength in far-off Laos or alienate Latin America further by another try in Cuba. Amidst these somber reflections we read the reply of the State Department to the Castro ploy of offering to discuss a formula for peaceful coexistence with us. Drawing itself up with the hauteur of an outraged spinster who has been leered at by a street loafer, the State Department primly ejaculated – "Communism in this hemisphere is not negotiable." What virtue! What stupidity! It means that we deny the sovereignty of Latin nations to choose their government. Also that we take the onus of rejecting better relations. Also that we have no sense of humor.

The Republicans are crossing their breasts in stained glass attitudes and saying politics stop at the water's edge. Actually they are aching to attack. It reminds us of how Bob Taft muted criticism of the Truman Administration at the start of Korea, and was denouncing it as "Mr. Truman's war" at the next election. Nixon put patriotism ahead of politics too until he began his attacks on Communism, Corruption and Korea. We don't object to this too much. We like argument. We deplore the flaccid pretense of not criticizing foreign mistakes and we don't think the British Labour opposition was unpatriotic for denouncing Korea. The only trouble here is that we suspect Nixon and the chauvinistic Republicans will assail Kennedy for the wrong reasons and demand stronger actions. They see their chance of getting the new Administration off balance and of keeping it on the defensive.

Test Case

★ Willard Shelton writes one of the best columns out of Washington in the weekly *AFL-CIO News* and we wonder that all the rest of the labor press doesn't buy it and run it. He points out that the Timken Roller Bearing Co. has sued to recover some $1.3 million for "institutional" advertising which the Internal Revenue has disallowed, on the grounds that fostering a "favorable climate" is not a deductible "business expense." This is a test case. Timken campaigned against "inflation" and a variety of social reforms which it alleged would bring inflation about. This practice has long struck us as an outrage. Directors of conservative companies spend millions of stockholders' money for such political ends and then charge 52 percent of the cost to the Treasury. The taxpayer finances his own brainwashing.

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December 16, 1944, was one of the black days of US military history. When Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt struck with his 36 divisions, General Omar Bradley found the German buildup "astonishing . . . I had greatly underestimated the enemy's capabilities." For the next 11 days the Nazis held the initiative. Not until six weeks – and 6,700 American dead – later were the Allied forces to win the Battle of the Bulge. Why had Bradley underrated enemy strength? Post-mortems established that G-2 field men had predicted the attack several days in advance, but the warning was discounted at higher levels. And the explanation for this set forth by one wartime intelligence insider has an interesting relevance in the aftermath of our humiliation in Cuba.

The root of the failure, or so George S. Pettee persuades us in *The Future of American Secret Intelligence*, lay in a gross misreading of the relationship between regime and people in Nazi Germany. Viscount Montgomery's intelligence staff had studied the negligible effect of the 1940 bombings on British morale and judged "that the effect on Germans for the same scale of attack would be comparable, in spite of the differences in the stage of the war and the character of the regime. But among the American agencies, the notion was held that while the democratic British . . . knew their only alternative was a barbarous and intolerable slavery, the German alternative to punishment from the air was merely to change leaders." From this misreading of popular psychology the US had concluded that German war production had been going *down* – whereas in fact, as the Strategic Bombing Survey was later to establish, aircraft production had gone up sixfold between 1939 and 1944, and the output of tanks, explosives and propellants two to three times.

Now the intelligence service of every country to some extent views the world through national lenses: the Soviets, for example, appear to have considerable difficulty in perceiving the political vitality of democratic states. But the American inability to see other societies as they are seems to be unusually marked and to run in a more or less direct line from certain wartime intelligence failures through the postwar years right up to Cuba. Just as someone at "Army Group" Headquarters in the Ardennes imposed his own preconceptions about a totalitarian society on top of the evident facts, so there were those in the Central Intelligence Agency who seem to have assumed that Fidel Castro was not the generally popular, to many almost charismatic

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Seeing-Eye Dog

figure, that he is but a despised tyrant holding sway solely through brute repression. The Cuban case clearly illuminates the disability of the US, with its unique social and political history, in comprehending other societies. It is as if Louis Hartz had this very situation in mind when he posed his penetrating question – "Can a people 'born free' ever understand peoples elsewhere that have to become so?" The question is more than rhetorical, for we are, after all, a people who have never experienced convulsive social revolution; a democratic people in a world made up for the most part of Right and Left totalitarianisms; and a prosperous people, becoming more prosperous, in a world of poor countries whose fixed attention is on the fact that they are getting poorer.

Some others, notably the British, are more worldly wise for the simple reason that they have been at it longer. And the Russians have a special advantage in appreciating both totalitarianism and poverty. However, the US can do as well as the rest – on the official level, at least – in estimating the affairs of other countries if the resources and expertise now available to the US Government are in fact put to effective use. There are in the State Department and Foreign Service, among the foreign affairs specialists of other departments, at the universities, and within the Central Intelligence Agency, men and women who have made the study of particular foreign societies the specialized work of many years. These are the Americans most likely to rise above our national insularity. John Foster Dulles paid little attention to them; he was noted for almost exclusive reliance on his personal judgment (and that of his brother Allen W. Dulles at CIA), and for ignoring to an astonishing degree the whole process of information-gathering and analysis carried on by his vast Department. Indeed, one of the major hopes vested in the Kennedy Administration was that expertise within the government would come into its own.

In some measure this has happened. Yet for the most part bureaucratic patterns have remained intact. State Department primacy in the formulation of foreign policy, which has been lost on many matters not only to the Pentagon but to the CIA as well, has yet to be re-established. The fact that what amounted to policy-making responsibility on Cuba had been allowed to the CIA by President Eisenhower was the natural end-result of a broad usurpation of power which took place, almost unnoticed, during those anomalous years when one Dulles ran the Department and another the Agency (the anomaly would be greater were the President, head of the legal government, to take the almost incredible step of naming his brother Robert as head of the "black" operations of CIA). Since the death of Foster Dulles this usurpation has grown increasingly visible, and Cuba turned a searing spotlight on the phenomenon of a government which has come to have, in effect, two State Departments.

Cops in Confusion

Significantly, the most capable expertise on many parts of the world is not to be found in CIA but in the State Department. When the wartime intelligence groups were disbanded, some 1,600 scholars and area experts who had been enlisted by the Office of Strategic Services became the nucleus of the State Department intelligence organization, while only a handful of OSS veterans found their way into the newly-formed CIA. The CIA had to start from scratch to develop its personnel, or to draw on the military and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the case of Latin America, the FBI men who had been given wartime responsibility for intelligence and counter-espionage work in the Western Hemisphere served as the core of the CIA regional staff. The Special Intelligence Service set up by the FBI for overseas work had performed effectively for seven years. But it was one thing to arrest enemy espionage agents and quite another to fathom the inner social and political workings of Latin American societies. The FBI was nonetheless loath to give up its adventures south of the border and made a serious

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effort to have an expanded SIS handle all of US worldwide civilian intelligence. Though this was rebuffed, the FBI Hemisphere organization was in the end incorporated into CIA more or less intact.

The voice of expertise has often been muted by the mere fact that the task of intelligence research and analysis has remained dispersed between the State Department, on the one hand, and the more lavishly financed CIA on the other. At present the CIA carries on not only the clandestine gathering of intelligence, as one would expect, but has built an organization in the field of overt intelligence so far-flung that it can claim greater authority on many subjects than the State Department, which must answer for its budget to Congress. Moreover, the CIA maintains its own elaborate machinery for analyzing and evaluating its findings, not only the evaluation at lower levels intrinsic to the effective direction of intelligence work but high-level, policy-focused summing up. This machinery has its apex in the so-called Board of National Estimates, whose judgments, inevitably implying policy recommendations, go directly to the National Security Council. Theoretically the National Estimates are the end product of all departments' intelligence; but the controlling bureaucratic fact is that the complex hierarchy for coordinating inter-departmental intelligence is – as Harry Howe Ransom of the Harvard Defense Studies program observes in his study, *Central Intelligence and National Security* – "capped by CIA."

The Cuban case has spotlighted the swollen power of the CIA more sharply in "operations" than in intelligence. (Ransom has pointed out in this connection that "the scope of CIA operations is to a large extent self-determined." It is intended to perform "only such activities as directed by the National Security Council. But who is the principal intelligence adviser to the NSC? . . . .The Director of Central Intelligence.") One hears it widely argued that the combination in a single agency of "operations" (*i.e.*, covert activities abroad, including para-military excursions such as the Cuban landing) with ordinary intelligence gathering invites the administrative danger that one side will simply serve to justify what the other is doing. General Maxwell Taylor is accordingly studying the desirability of transferring para-military operations to the Pentagon. But the crucial distinguishing feature of "intelligence" is that it is secret. Thus any reorganization of CIA should detach its overt activities and integrate all US foreign policy research and analysis, including the present evaluation functions of CIA – possibly under an autonomous agency, comparable to USIA, ICA or the Disarmament Administration in its relation to the State Department (and the White House). This would remove the pressures on a CIA-attached evaluation staff to make the Agency's own operatives look good. Clandestine intelligence and the conduct of covert "operations" would be the province of a thoroughly shaken-up CIA hierarchy.

Here it is important to point out that the clandestine side of intelligence-gathering, though quite crucial, is a relatively small part of the total process. In his April 25, 1947, memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee during the hearings leading up to the establishment of the CIA, Allen Dulles himself wrote: "Because of its glamor and mystery overemphasis is generally placed on what is called secret intelligence, namely the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and by secret agents. During war this form of intelligence takes on added importance but in time of peace the bulk of intelligence can be obtained through our overt channels, through our diplomatic and consular missions, and our military attachés . . . It can also be obtained through the world press. . . . A proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy." That is to say, while the possibilities for, say, the defection of certain unit leaders within the Cuban armed forces would have to be established through secret intelligence, more or less conclusive estimates of the general political mood of the country would not.

Splitting Up CIA

Mr. Dulles suggested at a later point in his memorandum that "to avoid splitting up and dissipating the personnel available for this work . . . the specialized intelligence agency within the State Department should be coordinated with, or amalgamated into, the branch of the Central Intelligence Agency devoted to the analysis and evaluation of intelligence." But if 80 percent of the informational raw material need not come through secret channels, the logic would seem to lie the other way around – in the relocation of CIA evaluation functions, including the National Estimates.

Precisely what new organizational chart might best serve our national needs in the gathering and processing of intelligence is for expert determination. The central objective should be a more integrated intelligence effort, more closely attuned to State Department policy planning but administratively autonomous. Conceivably, this might prove possible without radical surgery on the CIA – through the forthright exercise of the power inherent in the office of the Secretary of State. Certainly a hesitant and equivocating State Department which does not know what it wants will have little to say in the making of foreign policy, as a practical matter, no matter what is inscribed on the organizational charts.

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Specter of the Spaceman

The hoisting of a Soviet man into space last month triggered a week-long outburst of comment after the shock of the news subsided. Some commentators looked at it through the eyes of the uncommitted peoples and thought they detected a premonition of the downfall of Western civilization. Others saw it as a direct military threat and prophesied that Khrushchev would be a harder man to deal with in the near future. Finally, there were those who viewed it simply as another temporary setback in the competition for priority in space exploits that began when the USSR lofted Sputnik I into orbit three and a half years ago. They comforted themselves with the faith that sooner or later the massive momentum of our economy (more than $6 billion is spent yearly on government-sponsored scientific research) would ultimately push the US ahead – though it is far from comforting to ponder the fact that the Soviet space industry still manages to keep ahead of our own and may even have increased its lead. According to some of the experts, it will take the US from three to four years more to shoot as much weight, five tons, into space; if they also agree that we will have our "man" orbiting in space in a year, more or less, the difference is that he'll have to ride up in a lightweight vehicle.

To what degree is the Soviet leadership in heavy space rocket technology an immediate or potential military threat? It has been suggested that the Soviets may follow through with an action that is now technically feasible, the shooting aloft of an orbital bomber of the same weight loaded with atomic weapons that are set to be released at any point in the track of such a vehicle around the earth on receipt of a command signal from below. The prospect of this atomic-age Sword of Damocles suspended in the skies is a nightmare. This is dispelled for the time being, however, by the reminder that any bomb released from such a vehicle would simply circle the earth alongside it, since both are equally outside the earth's gravitational pull. If exploded it would destroy both itself and the parent vehicle; thus that particular combination of horrors would fizzle out in space. In order to get away from the space vehicle and return to earth the bomb would have to be a space rocket itself, propelled from it at the same speed but in the opposite direction; it would have to be pushed, not dropped down. And there are further difficulties of a more complex order in the maintenance of such a complex machine aloft, with its interlocked sets of what engineers call master and slave controls. It would have to be manned as well as armed, carry a stock of spare parts, and be accessible to more repairmen from below when any major breakdown occurs. Such a contraption – actually an armed space station – would necessarily be vulnerable to hostile "repairmen" directing or themselves riding up in space rockets launched from other countries.

What the US really confronts most urgently, in short, is not a military threat but rather the propaganda specter cast over much of the world by the Soviet technological and economic advance. The impact of the Spaceman on the uncommitted peoples has been peculiarly sharp, coming as it did so close on the humiliation of the Cuban landing. But it would in any case have posed with new clarity the choice before US policymakers – to compete or not to compete in an all-out effort to achieve our own space "spectaculars." And the choice may become all too clear in a few short months unless some progress is discernible on the demilitarization of space and the establishment of machinery for denationalized space exploration.

Bargain Counters

In collective bargaining, when the time comes for the cards to be laid on the table – and gains or losses subsequently picked up – each player wants not only to get something, but to get it in a sufficiently identifiable – not to say showy – fashion as to leave those peering over the players' shoulders in no doubt as to who got what was got. There is a sound reason for this. Payment of organization dues is likely to be enthusiastic in proportion to gains believed to have been exclusively won by the bargainers to whom the dues are paid.

To illustrate, the United Automobile Workers' contracts in the motor industry come up for renewal this year, and the union has just held a special collective bargaining conference in Detroit to plan strategy. Competition has always been keen between the labor organizations in motors and in steel. The UAW and the SWU, Walter Reuther and David McDonald, run each other's successive contracts through X-ray machines. Both unions were organized at the same time in the late Thirties, in industries where high technology and latterly automation have been rapidly introduced. The "package" one union has obtained from management has sometimes been larger than that won by the other, sometimes smaller. The kudos that come from taking home the prize package have gone to one, then to the other. Most often, the government has been a fascinated spectator.

But in 1961, when industry is not doing brilliantly anyhow, bargaining at the automotive table will be conducted in an atmosphere charged with the positive presence of government, unlike the atmosphere of the previous eight years. One of the first acts of the Kennedy Administration was the establishment of a Labor-Management Advisory Committee with Labor Secretary

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Goldberg alternating with Secretary of Commerce Hodges as chairman. A main purpose of this committee is to keep watch over agreements made in industries where large operations by relatively few firms facilitate the setting of administered prices. Insofar as greater productivity supplies a larger pie to be cut at the table, the function of this board goes no further than to remind the two groups that a price break for the consumer might prove beneficial all around. But where the clauses of a new contract would result in a price rise, the board as official compressor of the wage-price spiral is bound to be more actively interventionist. It is bound to press the claims of the absent party – the consumer (and the federal government is itself a large consumer).

This may explain why Mr. Reuther had so little to say at Detroit about a conventional wage hike and so much, instead, about a new proposal for a reduction in the work week with no loss of pay during serious unemployment. When the UAW's contracts were renewed, a built-in wage increase was inserted under the name of an annual improvement factor. Originally, this improvement factor was simply a computed average of actual productivity increases; latterly, since such computation is difficult (should the unit of calculation be an individual plant? the complete operations of a given corporation? the industry over-all?) the factor has become more and more related to what the traffic will bear; which is to say, what the public will tolerate. In this changed situation, the Labor-Management Advisory Committee becomes less an adviser and more a traffic signal. And as negotiations proceed later this year, it may seem to those who are doing the driving for the union that the Committee signal is lingering too long on yellow, or turning to red, when green is the UAW's preferred color.

There is another kind of bargaining in which again this Administration is more than a spectator – bargaining for civil rights. The NAACP, like the UAW, has its constituents. Its morale too requires frequent demonstrations of militancy. Responsible national leaders of the NAACP may privately think that the President's heart is in the right place, that he will do what he can to protect each citizen's civil rights. But if one is to retain command of understandably impatient rank-and-file members one cannot seem to give up too much too quickly at the bargaining table. Thus, it is probable that the Washington lobbyist of the NAACP will press for the enactment of additional civil rights legislation in this session. It will be said that judicial remedies, on which the NAACP has long relied, are not now enough.

A civil rights bill would afford liberals from districts where the Negro vote exercises a balance of power a chance to stand up and be counted and would give the NAACP a banner around which to rally support, but these cannot be the considerations that weigh most heavily in the mind of the President, who has no assured Congressional majority for even his minimum and most urgent measures to strengthen the country domestically and abroad. For the present, therefore, the Administration is concentrating on making progress in civil rights through channels *it*, rather than Congress, can control. And what it controls is appointments in the Executive branch. From Robert Weaver and Andrew Hatcher at top levels down through all posts at all grades in the federal service, Negroes have been and are being appointed. Similarly, over a wide range of federal contracts – in construction and other fields – equal hiring opportunities can be broadened through Executive action.

The NAACP should not be expected to say, or even to think, that such administrative action is enough; that is not its business. Nor could the UAW long command the loyalty of its workers if it said "enough" when "more" might be got. But neither is the Administration to be criticized, in our view, for declining to give them all that they ask.

Prospects for Tax Reform

In his tax message last week, President Kennedy recognized the need for reform and called upon his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Dillon, to put such a program before Congress next year. Meanwhile, he urged passage of a first-year tax program as a "first though urgent step" in the direction of over-all reform. In its economic approach, the program walks a tightrope between the notion that the way to recovery and faster economic growth is through more investment – and the counter-notion that it is through more consumption. It seeks to palliate the investment-minded by a scheme to give tax credits as incentives for business investment in new equipment. But it does nothing to overcome the objection that the write-off periods for obsolete equipment are not fast enough, or that present procedures are too involved in red tape.

The investment incentive is to be a credit against tax of 15 percent of all new plant and equipment investment expenditures in excess of current depreciation allowance and six percent below this level, but in excess of 50 percent of such depreciation allowances with 10 percent on the first $5,000 of new investment. An over-all limitation of 30 percent of the tax liability in any one year is imposed. The credit is not permitted for investment by public utilities other than transportation and investment in residential construction including apartments and hotels. (Eligible investment is limited to expenditures on new plant and equipment in the US with a useful life of six years or more.)

The credit would operate as follows. If a company that started operations in 1955 with an investment of

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$10 million (which it depreciates at the rate of $1 million per year) were to invest up to one-half million dollars in 1961, it would receive no tax credit except for the minimum of $500 available for the first $5,000 of investment. If it invests between one-half and one million dollars it would receive a credit of six percent of the excess over the lower figure. For investment in excess of $1 million it would receive a credit of 15 percent of such excess. In no case, however, could the credit exceed 30 percent of its tax liability for 1961.

The proposed tax credit obviously favors expansion over modernization, that is, it will operate to reward those who step up their normal rate of investment. To be sure, expansion usually includes modernization, for the most advanced machinery and equipment is generally installed. But the significant fact is that much modernization can and is likely to occur within the level of the normal depreciation allowance.

The emphasis on expansion may in a deeper sense be open to question. Overcapacity characterizes most of industry at this time and there may be fundamental economic factors militating against further expansion of manufacturing capacity which the tax credit may not significantly alter. The tax credit can operate only marginally to stimulate maintenance of the existing level of investment, and it is this which could well turn out to be our most critical need during the next few years. A tax credit or accelerated depreciation of any *new* investment would appear to be more appropriate.

Indeed, one may question whether there is any need at all for a tax subsidy to private investment at a time when the economy seems to be out of joint – with too much investment in the private sector and too little in the public sector. As Professor Alvin Hansen recently pointed out in this journal, the solution of our structural unemployment may be possible only through the expansion of services rather than the production of goods, and this primarily through the growth of the public sector. Professor Hansen's thesis casts doubt on President Kennedy's premise that the tax credit, by inducing additional private investment, will create more jobs as a long-term solution of underemployment. Actually any modernization it would stimulate will in the end create additional technological unemployment.

This is not to say that the modernization of *obsolete* productive facilities is out of order. Nor should one rule out a tax credit such as the President proposes at some future date when existing overcapacity is fully utilized and there is need to stimulate investment in more private productive capacity.

The program is described as a balanced or neutral one in terms of revenues lost and gained. Somewhat naïvely, it is said that the $1.7 billion cost of the tax-credit will be offset by gains from five other proposed changes: withholding at the source of 20 percent of all taxable interest and dividends paid, $600 million; repeal of the $50 exclusion and 4 percent credit on dividends received, $450 million; limitation on deductible business entertainment expenses and gifts, $250 million; increased taxes on foreign earnings, $250 million; and taxation as ordinary income, rather than capital gains, of the profit made on the sale of depreciated property, $200 million. But none of these things could have profound effects on future income and investment patterns. Some businessmen have suggested, for instance, that the tax-credit scheme could conceivably touch off a vast sale-and-lease-back of plant and equipment to obtain the maximum tax-credit percentage. If this rather marginal possibility should materialize, the revenue loss to the Treasury undoubtedly would be greater than the $1.7 billion estimated. Similarly, real estate men have advanced the claim that application of the ordinary income rates to the sale of depreciated real estate would choke off the great bulk of such transfers, lessening – not increasing – the government's receipts.

In terms of equity, the program takes a step – but no giant step – toward overcoming present tax distortions. No one will deny the President's contention that widespread abuse of business expense accounts has sapped the nation's moral as well as its economic fiber. Nor is it difficult to agree that the dividend credit is a give-away to taxpayers in the upper income brackets. In terms of revenues lost, however, none of the loopholes to be plugged compares with those that remain: the $1.5 billion lost through oil and mineral depreciation allowances, the $2.6 billion lost through preferred treatment of capital gains, and the $4 billion lost through income splitting by married couples.

If business in general has offered small support for the tax-credit scheme, business in particular can be expected to put up a last-ditch fight in opposition to the ending of specific tax privileges. Large corporations can be expected to oppose the proposed change in the taxation of income earned by foreign subsidiaries, financial institutions the dividend and interest withholding, and real estate interests the treatment as income of profits from the sale of depreciated property. The aviation industry can be expected to oppose a proposed increase in the tax on aviation gasoline and jet fuel.

Always jealous of its prerogatives, but never more than of its control of the purse strings, Congress can be expected to do something about depreciation. What it does, though, will undoubtedly be along lines more conventional than the new investment tax-credit. Expense account tightening and interest-dividend withholding seem other likely possibilities. But without a compelling reason either to increase or decrease taxes generally, the possibility of comprehensive reform seems remote – next year as much as now.

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Follow That Man, He's Sick

A recent issue of *TV Guide* contained an article denouncing one of the most popular current television programs, *The Untouchables*, for its violence and sadism. (There are now two teenage gangs in Eastern cities calling themselves "The Untouchables," but these have adopted the mores of the gangsters, not of the FBI squad.) But the article never got around to wondering why the program is so successful. The attraction seems to me to lie in its simplicity. Cops and robbers shoot, beat, threaten, lie and manipulate with almost equal agility. The essential difference between them is in what they pursue: the gangsters go after money, the cops go after gangsters. Fairly periodically, a well-dressed, sneering gangster chief appears in the dingy office of Eliot Ness, curls his lip at the surroundings, and asks Ness when he is going to get smart; invariably the incorruptible Ness throws the gangster out on his ear. Since Ness and his boys cannot be tempted by money, cowed by danger, nor swerved by conflicting obligations, and since nothing straightens the gangsters out but a sock on the jaw or a bullet in the belly, the viewer can enjoy a morality play (Ness as Mr. Pure-of-Heart) without surrendering his sense of modernity.

This is becoming rare. "Adult Westerns" and many of the mystery shows have long since succumbed to complexity. Their villains are likely to be sublimating repressions, suffering from the effects of a disturbed childhood, or in need of a lobotomy. It generally no longer suffices for the hero to rescue the girl; he has to ruminate about the interrelationships of character and environment. In *Gunsmoke*, for instance, Chester provides not only comic relief but also the banalities which Dillon can refine into Dodge City profundities.

What we have here is a reflection of the modern shift from villainy to maladjustment. The growing influence of sociologists and psychologists, the increasing stress on environmental factors to which the development of character is related, the spread of relativistic ethics, the distinctions made in court between youthful and hardened offenders, and between deliberate murder and temporary insanity – all have conspired to turn moralists into determinists. There is nothing especially new about the claim that man is at least partially the product of his environment. Edmund in *King Lear* and Uriah Heep in *David Copperfield* both make self-explanatory speeches, or, to use the jargon, are convincingly motivated; which alters their villainy not a whit. It is Lear who is mad, not Edmund. Today, however, the claim has acquired the implication that what has been shaped (or distorted) by environment is no more to be judged morally than what has been formed by heredity.

This shift in perspective is reflected in contemporary fiction and movies as well as in television. Herman Wouk's Captain Queeg, for all his early resemblance to the traditional villain, is finally shown to be a very sick man (and simultaneously a highly useful member of society). The main characters of John Barth's *The End of the Road*, to take a far better novel than Wouk's, are *sick*, not immoral; the guilt feelings that overtake the narrator, Jacob Horner (a symbolic Satan figure), are mixed up with his peculiar illness, called "immobility" by his doctor. *Rebel Without a Cause* and innumerable movies like it explain juvenile delinquency in terms of the maladjusted home. *Twelve Angry Men*, *A Face in the Crowd* and *A Hatful of Rain* supply everything but a psychoanalyst's couch.

It may be that the adoption of what seem to be objective standards of sanity to replace what have been shown to be subjective standards of ethics appeals to a writer because, as a didactic tool, it is now the stronger of the two. Moral appeals are too uncertain.

About two years ago, in a discussion of 10 young American novelists, Malcolm Cowley pointed out that, "by abandoning the notion of sin and atonement, the novelist loses a whole range of values on which fiction used to depend," and asked: "How can a novelist write another *Crime and Punishment* when he does not believe in punishment or crime?"

One answer might be to call it *Aberration and Rehabilitation*. Society, once an abstract agglomeration of impersonal forces, has become as concrete as a web of highways, and consequently a writer can substitute questions of social tendencies and directions for matters of crime and punishment. The two most widely-read political novels in English of our time are probably *Brave New World* and *1984*. Both books approach political and social questions from a moral perspective, and both conclude that morality is Reason. In the worlds of Huxley's and Orwell's fantasies, crime is overt sanity, and the punishment is suicide, expulsion, or Room 101; in our world, crime is overt irrationality, and the punishment is treatment, ostracism, or failure.

We have become accustomed to the idea that the difference between us and heroes is only their heroism, nothing more. This is one of the comforts of democracy. But I wonder whether we can be quite as comfortable with the notion that the difference between us and a villain is only his maladjustment, that there, but for the grace of heredity and environment, go we? Should we adopt this attitude, *The Untouchables*, I suspect, will lose its popularity, not for its violence, but for its elemental distinctions. Meanwhile, we confront fictional villains with a peculiar dilemma – to go crazy or face extinction.

RUDOLF B. SCHMERL

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A Clean Break

A time of national crisis is no time for recrimination and as a rule even a just assessment of blame may well be postponed until the dust settles. President Kennedy is keenly aware of this, as is proved by his assumption of full responsibility for the Cuban mess.

Everybody knows he is not fully responsible. It was not he who continued to support the monstrous Batista until the Cuban people went mad and chose a Communist in preference to Our Boy, the tyrant. It was not he who originated the scheme that ended in the calamitous invasion. But he was President when the crash came, and it is unbecoming for the President of the United States to attempt to pass the buck for anything that happens during his administration.

So when he said, "I accept the responsibility," he was acting correctly. He was more than correct. There is a familiar ring to those words in the ears of anyone acquainted with American history. The phrase was constantly used by one of Mr. Kennedy's predecessors, and no inconsiderable one, either. True, Kennedy spoke quietly where Andrew Jackson thundered, but the sentiment is the same, and it is a sentiment the American people like. At the same time it strikes a superficial observer that he may weaken the force of his declaration by overdoing this consultation business. It is of the utmost importance to preserve national unity, of course, but why should Mr. Kennedy suppose that national unity is in danger? Presumably because of the narrowness of his popular majority last November.

Apparently it is beyond his power to realize that he actually won a tremendous personal indorsement. Right after the election it was noted in this place that the Democrats spotted Mr. Nixon four million votes when they nominated a Catholic. The University of Michigan surveyors make it five. Even Tom O'Neill in the *Baltimore Sun* concedes a million and a half. Yet still he won.

True, he was fortunate in his opponent. Mr. Nixon simply was not liked. Had the Republicans nominated any other Protestant, Rockefeller for instance, not four but six or seven millions might have gone over.

The point is, it was purely religious prejudice, not dislike of the man. Now that he is elected, it is commonplace to hear men who voted anti-Catholic say that on the whole the election was probably a pretty good thing for the best man won. Yet after all, he *is* a Catholic and to him it may smack of disloyalty to the faith to attribute his narrow squeak to his religion, rather than to his own deficiencies. There also Kennedy accepts the responsibility. As a demonstration of character it is pretty fine; but it may betray him into errors in policy-making. For what the people expect of him is leadership, especially in foreign affairs, that is distinctly different from that which they have had for the past eight years. Brinkmanship is no good. We have given it a long – an inexcusably long – trial and the net results are that Cuba, temporarily at least, is lost, half of South America is tottering, de Gaulle is openly contemptuous and even Britain is sour, while Mao rubs his hands and Khrushchev cackles with glee.

Kennedy will certainly take a different line, but his delusion that he is only dubiously the people's choice may blind him to the necessity of making everybody know that he is taking a different line. What is needed is some act that will symbolize a clean break with the past. It need not be a very important act, provided it is spectacular. Instead, we are seeing incessant consultations with the very men who got us into the mess, which looks like the opposite of a break with the past.

Kennedy's current troubles are the logical result of Eisenhower's bland refusal to be President. The outcome has been a collapse of discipline throughout the whole establishment. It has come to the place at which every two-by-twice bureaucrat feels free to ignore or even reverse the President's orders whenever he is so disposed. This is the basic explanation of the Cuban fiasco. Everybody undertook to run the show.

Yet to re-establish discipline once it has broken down is always a nasty job. When Kennedy tries it he will run into the most vicious kind of opposition and it will continue and probably increase up to the moment that he demostrates in a loud and gaudy fashion that he is a dangerous man to defy. By the same token, national unity will be in danger up to that same moment.

But it will solidify instantly, and with granitic firmness when the people learn that the man they have chosen to be President is in fact President, himself, personally, with no stooges or stand-ins. The average American was happy to hear Kennedy say, "I assume the responsibility." But if a couple of insubordinate bureaucrats should come sailing down the stairs without touching the steps, the average American would say, "Damned if he didn't!" and be happier still.

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Young Germany

by Walter Z. Laqueur

It is almost 20 years since war broke out and 16 since it ended, and meanwhile a new generation has grown up in Germany. In a few years the majority of Germans will have no direct personal recollection of the Third Reich. In 1930, when the National Socialists had just arrived on the political scene as a major force, they occupied a dominant position in most German universities, and in such places as Breslau and Erlangen they polled more than 70 percent of the total. Today the situation is quite different. Student elections of this sort are no longer held, the idea is discouraged, and there would be no great interest in them anyway.

But the prevailing outlook of students is indicated in other ways. About a quarter still belong to the traditional "corporations," and about 10 percent to the so-called fighting corporations. These are disquieting figures, for the corporations with their caste spirit, their drinking bouts, and their duels, were the seedbed of reactionary political attitudes both in Wilhelminian Germany and in the Weimar Republic, yet close inquiry reveals considerable differences between the situation now and that of 30 years ago. The *"Korps Student"* is by no means the representative figure he used to be. The social composition of the student body, to begin with, has changed; the number of students has quadrupled since 1959 and the majority no longer come from well-to-do homes, but have to make ends meet on $50 to $60 a month. About two-fifths receive stipends in one form or another to enable them to continue their studies. A full 10 percent (about 18,000) are foreigners, and this too has affected life in the universities. On the whole, these young men and women display a larger measure of intellectual interest than their predecessors even though their political education seems to be deficient. (They applaud with equal enthusiasm speakers who advocate an anti-Soviet offensive, and others who urge pronounced neutralist and even defeatist views.) To belong to a corporation is considered faintly ridiculous, though it may be of some help in certain professions in later life. Duelling still goes on, but has largely become a symbolical ritual, no more dangerous than driving a sports car, for the combatants are so well padded that grave injuries are unlikely. Still the fact remains that the corporations preserve the traditional ideology, which is almost invariably conservative and nationalist. A few have declared that they cannot identify themselves with any existing political party, since none is far enough to the Right to satisfy them. These right-wingers dislike the newfangled "European consciousness" among a growing section of academic youth and counter it with the time-honored political traditions. At one time there was even a small neo-Nazi organization, the *Bund* of National Students, since banned. But by and large, right-wing extremism has not been able to get a firm foothold.

Not that concerted efforts in that direction have been lacking. Even total defeat did not altogether eradicate radical nationalism in Germany. World War II produced a psychological trauma much like that which followed the First; and not a few young lieutenants of the *Waffen SS* and similar units thought their years in the trenches were the best years of their lives. After those days of excitement and comradeship, what a miserable contrast it was to endure life under postwar conditions, the race for daily bread, the absence of any community spirit, the invidious de-Nazification! Hitler might have made some mistakes but the German soldier had proved himself the best in the world, in a fight against hopeless odds. It may be significant that while there is little interest in openly neo-Nazi literature, serial booklets such as *Der Landser,* which glorify the exploits of German soldiers from Sevastopol to El Alamein, are on sale at every railway station, and millions of copies are bought. From this milieu leaders emerged for the postwar *Bund.* Politically, they are irrelevant, and have never succeeded in recapturing the old confidence and fighting spirit; they rather resemble the veterans' associations that sprang up after the First World War: traditionalist in character, they lack the dynamism needed for a potential mass movement.

Although neo-Nazism as a political movement is insignificant among the younger generation, however, one cannot altogether discount its influence in the sphere of thought, where it survives in various forms as an element in the intellectual climate. Old bards of the Third Reich, such as the late Hans Grimm or Hermann Burte, still have their faithful devotees: the *Klüter Blatter,* a literary monthly, serves as a platform

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for fighters against "cultural Bolshevism" and as an advocate of "blood and soil" ideals. The propagators of cultural neo-Nazism today are often teachers in secondary schools and, less frequently, university professors. These are men who were students in 1930 and think it bad form to abjure the ideals of their youth. They were harder hit than any other (and not wholly unjustly) by de-Nazification: most of them were disqualified from teaching for a period of five to ten years, a deprivation which has intensified their resentment against the new order and all its values. One of them, Hans Venatier, continued after the war to contribute to neo-Nazi publications, including *Nation Europa*, until in 1959 he became a martyr in the eyes of the right-wing extremists; for, after receiving a warning from his superiors about his extra-curricular activities, he committed suicide. This was an extreme case: but there are others, more circumspect and less hysterical than Venatier, still disseminating similar doctrines.

The old Hitler Youth leadership has entirely disappeared from the scene. The original *Führer* of German youth, von Schirach, who was almost the only one to show some sort of repentance at Nuremberg, is in Spandau prison, one of the few war criminals remaining there. He has been divorced by his wife (whose biography, published not long ago, seems to reflect even more unfavorably on herself than on her former husband). The man who under Hitler succeeded to the position of Baldur von Schirach as "youth leader" is now very active in the import-export business – specializing, it is said, in trade relations with China. And the poet of the Hitler Youth who wrote the famous song about "Germany today, tomorrow the whole of the world," now turns out "progressive" verse which gains more appreciation in East than in West Germany.

What Do German Children Think?

But if the old war horses have removed to greener pastures, and if the effect of the unregenerate teachers is probably limited, it remains a question whether the deep, subliminal roots of German attitudes toward such subjects as nationalism or anti-Semitism have really begun to wither away. What do German children really think about the Jews? The evidence is curiously conflicting. According to an interesting study of prejudices against Negroes and Jews, published lately in Cologne (*Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, IV, 1959), research among 14- and 15-year-olds in several West German cities has shown that the Jews are still (barring only the Russians) the people most hated and feared. When asked to name the characteristics they associated with the Jews, the majority voted for "avaricious," "deceitful," "cowardly," etc. It might be argued that anti-Semitism of this kind has religious roots, for the inquiries were made in Catholic regions where National Socialism had never been strong; and, since Turks and Mohammedans were also, rather surprisingly, placed near the top of the list of undesirable peoples, and their "heathen" character was repeatedly emphasized, this explanation seems to have much to commend it. But another investigation in northwest Germany among slightly older children produced very different results: Less than one percent of those interrogated revealed strong anti-Semitic views. The great majority was critical of Hitler and, what was perhaps more important, thought the extermination of six million Jews the most reprehensible of Hitler's crimes. Above all there is bewilderment: a Jewish official who frequently lectures in West German schools told the author that most of the 16- or 17-year-olds have never met a Jew; again and again he could see that the fact of their meeting a Jew in the flesh was of greater interest to his audience than the contents of his lectures.

If there still is anti-Jewish prejudice among the younger generation, some observers tend to put the blame on the generation of the grandparents. Most parents simply prefer to shirk an answer when asked by their children what happened in Germany, and to the Germans, after 1933.

That "silence of the fathers" has become a leading theme in the works of young German writers who have made their reputations since the last war. Christian Geissler's *Die Anfrage* ("The Query") was the most-discussed book of 1960 and merits particular mention. Its hero, Klaus Koehler, is a young physicist with what seems to most of his friends an obsessive preoccupation with the recent past. The building which houses Koehler's laboratory was previously occupied by a Jewish family, whose history Koehler sets himself to reconstruct, clue by clue; but the only survivor dies just before Koehler discovers him; unknown to the young physicist the Jew had been lodging with him in the same house. The book is a merciless dissection of German attitudes during the Third Reich, in particular those of the parental generation which now seeks to disclaim all responsibility: "We are out in search of fathers, and that is not a pretty thing; we are looking for fathers who will tell the truth . . . who are repentant, who will think with us about the way they went, and the way we have to go into the future." And having failed to find such fathers, he has concluded that no attempts to gloss over past crimes will redeem Germany, but only a radical break with the past. In brief, that the present generation has, or should have, no fathers.

Such views, needless to say, have bitterly antagonized many Germans: By what right does this younger generation indict its elders? Would it not have acted in exactly the same way? Some critics have hailed

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Geissler as the foremost spokesman for youth today, while others have accused him of high treason. Since the book has been republished in East Germany, the author has incurred the inevitable charge of Communist subversion – at least by implication. The charge is nonsensical in this particular instance. But since accusations of Communist collaboration recur from time to time in discussions of German youth, one must briefly sketch the situation that gives rise to them; and this involves, in its turn, other problems connected with the state of things in East Germany.

East German Youth

German educationists have shown deep concern over the developments in that alienated portion of their country. Another few years of political indoctrination, they say, and it will no longer be possible to find a common language with the younger generation in the "German Democratic Republic." The assumption is almost certainly unduly pessimistic. The younger "Pioneers" in East Germany enthusiastically identify themselves with the ideals of Communism, but such an acceptance of the outlook of one's teachers and leaders is common enough all over the world until the critical faculties begin to develop at the age of 16 or 17. It is then, after having left school, that young people come in contact for the first time with realities and discover, often to their consternation, that there is a great gulf between the ideals of socialism, democracy and humanism and the society around them in which these ideals are ostensibly realized. At that stage of development their Marxist-Leninist education often turns out to be a mixed blessing from the point of view of the Communist establishment. The young men and women apply the rational and dialectical thinking they have been taught to their own environment, and the results are often not what were intended to be. Politically, East German students are often more sophisticated than their West German colleagues. There is, it is true, a small left-wing minority in West German universities which shows signs of passionate political interest. Their activities have caused considerable headaches to the authorities. Even the Social Democrats have had serious troubles with their student organization for years, and lately also with the "Falcons," the youth group of the party, whose insistence upon unilateral disarmament, neutralism, etc., has been at variance with the official party program. But this extremism reflects dissatisfaction with the social and cultural effects of the "economic miracle" rather than sympathy with the East German Communists.

Of greater significance than these political activities is the cultural atmosphere engendered by the young intellectuals of the Left. Very few of them are active in politics: even a torchlight parade in favor of the Algerian rebels which I witnessed was no great success judged by the number of participants. But to be *against* Bonn, to decry the vulgarity, the arrogance and mental dullness of present-day West German Society – this is simply obligatory in circles far wider than their own. It is perhaps symptomatic that in a recently-published symposium on life in the *Bundesrepublik*, the one writer out of 15 who had a good word to say about the Bonn regime was of foreign origin and also belonged to the older generation. (It is noteworthy, too, that he was the only one who wrote a simple and elegant German instead of the opaque and pretentious style so much in vogue among the younger people.)

One can say of these young people that their hearts are in the right place but one is not so sure about their heads. Their shrill, polemical approach to every question does not endear them to a public that prefers the obvious benefits of the economic miracle. Nor can the public be said to have treated the intellectuals like stepchildren: there are numerous prizes, authors' fees are as high as anywhere in Europe, and some modest fortunes have been made by authors who specialize in denunciations of the evil consequences of Germany's "miraculous" economic recovery. If the conservative forces in contemporary West Germany occasionally conjure up memories of Wilhelminian society, there is something in the climate of thought among the left-wing intelligentsia that is all too reminiscent of the Weimar Republic. The leading Marxist philosophers of the day, George Lukacs and Ernst Bloch, both reprinted in West Germany, are held in greater esteem than any Western thinker. Among popular journalists, the writer most widely republished in recent years is Kurt Tucholsky, who committed suicide in 1935, whose work was intimately associated with the Weimar period and, many thought, was destined to be forgotten with it. (The sales of Tucholsky's works have been exceeded only by those of *The Diary of Anne Frank* – 750,000 copies so far.) Though practically unknown outside Germany, Tucholsky was a satirist of genius, but his political judgment was not equally well developed, and it is a moot point whether his mordant essays did as much harm to the Nazis as to the Weimar Republic.

Besides the Tucholsky revival, there is the unabating popularity of Brecht, as well as renewed interest in authors, painters and composers of the Twenties. There are also films with a political or social message in the tradition of the Twenties, such as *The Bridge*, in which the senseless sacrifices of the war are pilloried, or *Roses for the Prosecutor* which shows parents being ridiculed by their own children. Both films were tremendous successes with German youth. This rediscovery of the Twenties was a subject of discussion at a special conference of leading sociologists, literary historians and

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critics lately held in Munich, and many of them regarded it rather disapprovingly, whereas the younger people were clearly fascinated by the abundant cultural fertility of the Weimar period and tend to draw uncomfortable parallels with the present day.

These are some of the problems facing the younger generation of German intellectuals – those born, say, between 1930 and 1940. What of their younger brothers now at high school and college? A recent British visitor to Germany, himself a teacher by profession, said German youth today seemed to be without ideals, without faith and without guidance; "It is a skeptical generation, politically immature, democratically naïve, strongly opposed to militarism, or to discipline of any sort." Friedrich Sieburg, one of West Germany's leading essayists, thinks the new "skeptical generation" is uncritical and therefore defenseless, while a writer in *Der Monat* has said that West German youth is "neither nationalist, nor European, neither anti-Semitic nor anti-Nazi, neither pacifist nor militarist, neither materialist, idealistic nor realist." "It is nothing at all, and I find it horrible." Such generalizations often reveal more about the writer than about the young generation, which simply may not yet have had its say. There is indeed little idealism among German youth today in comparison with the generation of their fathers, but in a country whose history has been marked by an excess of idealism, this may not be a bad thing, especially when we remember some of the things done by the fanatics of the SS. The young people of today are preoccupied with their careers; they prefer to be left alone.

The Pursuit of Simple Pleasures

Class and caste count for less and authority commands no automatic obeisance. Neither teachers nor parents are implicitly trusted as advisers or intellectual guides. What they have heard about German history has not made them particularly proud of it, and among many there is a sense of belonging to some wider European society. However vague a feeling this may be, it is a factor to be reckoned with. The British observer quoted above remarked that one "never hears the national anthem today . . . German youth has little understanding for the 'lost territories'; it is politically apathetic in its pursuit of simple pleasures."

This apathy was even more palpable five or seven years ago, when *ohne mich* (count me out) was the universal catch-phrase of the day. Since then, there has been a phase of greater willingness to get involved. Whether this is all for the good we shall only know later. There are thoughtful people who feel that the revolt against authority has gone too far, that a young generation without roots or loyalties is exposed to great dangers, and that the spirit of suspicion toward the present regime is not conducive to the growth of sound democracy in Germany. All this is very true, but one fails to see how it could be otherwise. It is an outstanding example of the fathers eating sour grapes and the children's teeth being set on edge. And yet encouraging signs are by no means absent. I realized this perhaps most vividly when an elderly physician told me the story of Mrs. Ludin and her children one evening last winter in a Tübingen restaurant. "Frau Ludin lives in this city. You remember the name?" I did remember: I was a boy when the Reichwehr officers Ludin, Scheringer and Wendt were arrested for subversive Nazi activities in 1930. That was an exciting case, and it became even more so when Scheringer in prison announced his conversion to Communism after long discussions with his fellow prisoners and a series of unsatisfactory meetings with Hitler and Goebbels. Ludin, on the other hand, remained a staunch National Socialist, rose rapidly to some power and importance in the Third Reich, and extended protection to his old comrade Scheringer (who had meanwhile become a farmer in Bavaria) in spite of their political differences. Scheringer survived the Hitler regime, begot a great many children (most of whom live in East Germany today) and told his story in an incredibly naïve, rambling, but rightly revealing autobiography published in 1959. Ludin, having become German Ambassador to Slovakia before the Third Reich's collapse, was duly arrested and a year or two later the Czech authorities demanded his appearance, with a number of Slovak collaborators, at a big trial of war criminals. Ludin could fairly easily have escaped extradition, as he was entreated to do by his friends. But he refused: "I was in command (he is reported to have said), and I am responsible for whatever happened at Pressburg." He felt bound to appear as a witness for the defense, was extradited and, in due course, tried and hanged.

So far the story is fairly well known; in German right-wing circles Ludin's *Opfergang* (sacrifice) has become part of the standard hagiography. My acquaintance went on to tell me what he felt to be the truly shattering sequel: "You know, I met Frau Ludin only the other day. She told me how she had tried in vain to talk to her children about their father. 'No, mother', they said, 'we don't want to hear about him. We've heard a very different story and we know better. At school and in the youth movement they have told us all about the Nazis and all about the ideals father gave his life for; and we don't want to hear of him any more'." My acquaintance was deeply shocked. "I only wish," he added indignantly, "that I knew what they are teaching young people nowadays? – is it to be ashamed of their own parents?" But he ended, almost in a tone of resignation: "You know, it may be something more than a break between the generations."

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The Mind of John F. Kennedy

by Frederic W. Collins

One of the most stylish weddings of this or any other year united the mind of John F. Kennedy with the Presidency of the United States. While the intensity of the courtship had been observable to the whole public for a year and more, it was not evident until after the ceremony just how deeply the mind was in love with the job. Ambition, extroverted self-esteem, and the other routine motivations of politicians can explain the pursuit, but the unflawed happiness the mind finds in its union with the Presidency is something that makes this Presidency new and different.

A large body of expert testimony about the quality and properties of the Kennedy mind is available in Washington, largely because the President attracts to himself people who are interested in – as a spectator sport – among many other things, minds. Out of this expert testimony, separate properties of the Kennedy mind can be isolated and described on authority. Some of the principal ones, in summary, are these:

A compulsive instinct for inquiry, effectively used. Utter independence. A range of concern which thrusts the Presidency far out and deep down in the government. An insistence on extracting decisions from a sum total of original materials instead of from alternatives pre-cooked by staff. An ease of decision, including decision on what needs to be decided, and when. A talent for suspended judgment, strikingly described as "an ability to live with chaos." An instinct for the relevant. A sense of personal responsibility equalling the most rigorous doctrine of command responsibility. Sharp, drift-free tuning which permits movement from one problem to another without overlap or confusion. An all-encompassing political sensitivity ranging from the world to the ward. An unflagging intent of action. A zest which confers absurdity upon all the melodramatic and maudlin folklore about the loneliness, anguish and burdens of the Presidency.

These are the properties of the Kennedy mind, and I am by no means one of those ready to conclude, on the strength of the admittedly serious error of his Administration in the Cuba case, that they are not the intellectual qualities of a potentially distinguished President.

Kennedy's extraordinary curiosity is linked to an expressed belief that getting information is one of the greatest difficulties confronting a President, that the more people he can see and the more widely he is exposed to different ideas, including clashing ideas, the more effective he can be. Obviously, he has two main ways of getting information: Reading, and talking with people. His reading has been rather fully described. His art in discussion is perhaps even more impressive, and less well-known.

To Kennedy, it is said by those close to him, conversation and discussion and meeting people are always a means of finding something out or putting into a head something he wants there, or both. One expert on such matters, impressed by Kennedy's skill as an interviewer, called him "the best reporter in town."

One recent day he had as successive visitors G. Frederick Reinhardt, ambassador designate to Italy, and Lord Louis Mountbatten, chief of the British defense staff, accompanied by General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Kennedy had already had two sessions with Reinhardt. This was a farewell. In the environment of their conversation were such circumstances, not spoken of, as the fact that Kennedy is a Catholic, that the United States has no emissary to the Vatican; and that Rein-

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Veteran Washington correspondent FREDERIC W. COLLINS *wrote this article – before the unsuccessful US-supported landing of Cuban exiles – as a picture of "what seem to be continuing qualities of mind, a picture which is not altered by a single transitory event."*

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hardt, accredited only to Italy, will in Rome be in the heart of the Vatican's relationship with Italy and the rest of the world. Kennedy gave Reinhardt no explicit instructions. He interviewed him: About his knowledge of the Vatican, Vatican-Italian relations, the role of an ambassador to a capital encompassing the Vatican state, his knowledge of Catholicism, his views on Italy, the governmental problems of Italy, and four or five leading Italian political personalities. It did not seem to be a catechism, but a searching and probing for information. When Reinhardt didn't know an answer, Kennedy did not make it embarrassing but slid the question off as a passing thought; Reinhardt, for his part, no doubt understood he would do well to get the answers for his own needs. Kennedy knew the Italian background and knew the Reinhardt background as a career officer. He was educating himself – and the ambassador. In respect to a preconceived State Department opinion, Kennedy said, "Better challenge that before you act. Let's see if it's still right this year."

In the talk with Mountbatten, who preceded Reinhardt, Kennedy had ranged from Hong Kong to Berlin by way of NATO and such specific problems as nuclear arms for NATO. In each case he got an opinion from Mountbatten. In turn, Mountbatten got a vivid impression of what was in Kennedy's mind. While the President of the United States cannot dictate NATO policy, Kennedy certainly planted ideas in the Mountbatten mind which would color his thinking and are probably bound to affect policy.

The interview demonstrated the retentiveness of Kennedy's mind. With Mountbatten, he discussed Berlin contingency plans. It had been six weeks or more since the Kennedy mind absorbed that information, but it was immediately on call in detail as if, it was remarked, he had been working on it for 20 years. Examples of his power of retention abound. In one press conference he remarked that he was "somewhat familiar" with the disarmament conversations which took place in Geneva "from 1928 to 1929 through 1933-34," when he was in his 'teens. Various persons independently call that understatement, and testify that Kennedy has almost total recall of that voluminous record. When he first took it in is not known, but it is assumed he brushed up on it in the campaign.

The judgment has also been made that through unrelenting inquiry, Kennedy, when he came to interview Robert S. McNamara for the post of Secretary of Defense, was able to employ a broader knowledge of Pentagoniana than Dwight Eisenhower could claim after 37 years in the Army – part of it in the Pentagon – and eight White House years. The comparison draws malicious chuckles, but is meaningful just the same.

Kennedy's interest in differing opinions and currents of information is so great that he has formalized arrangements for making sure he gets them. That is one of the things the operation conducted by McGeorge Bundy as his special assistant, and Walt W. Rostow as Bundy's deputy, is all about: To give Kennedy information on State Department and Defense Department matters independent of what the departments provide. This looks awkward and dangerous on an organization chart, but it is asserted that Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara know and accept the purpose of the arrangement and there is no resentment.

The importance of information to Kennedy is demonstrated by a converse example. The clumsiest move he has made, the nomination of his friend Earl E. T. Smith, former ambassador to Cuba, as ambassador to Switzerland, resulted from a failure of information. Somewhere down the line in the State Department an officer did not make the significant association between Smith's service in Cuba and the present Swiss function of representing US interests there. It is amazing that Kennedy did not make the association himself, or pick it up in his seine, and catch on to the prospect of Swiss resentment. But the failure was complete all around, up and down, and had to be marked as a Kennedy error.

His curiosity may be the most important characteristic of his method of conducting the Presidency. It is indispensable to solo decision. When a matter comes before him, he is the one man who has read all the lessons, heard all the arguments, commands all the information. No one could write down for him all the considerations involved. He has acquired them for himself from all his sources, or he doesn't have them.

There is evidence that Kennedy consciously wills it that way. The speed and vigor with which he brushhooked his way through the committee growth in the government reflects his resistance to, and his rejection of, preordained decisions, his refusal to choose among alternatives formulated elsewhere than in his own mind. There is dependable testimony that Kennedy understands, as Churchill understood, the danger built into any organization that alternatives will be so defined by staff as to mean the staff is dictating executive decision. Any President learns that the Presidency is not a collective office. Kennedy seems to have known this instinctively at once.

Kennedy's solo performance as a decider arises also from a sense of personal responsibility which has been developed, it must be assumed, by his whole background, upbringing and training. To those around him, it is symbolized by the physical mass of the papers on his desk, and displayed in his insistence on knowing the name and the face of every person in the pattern of responsibility centered in himself. He takes all the responsibility which is his, and expects others to take all which is theirs. But, as in the case of a ship's captain, the total responsibility for the whole system comes, in his mind, to lie upon no one but himself.

One of the happiest gifts of the Kennedy mind, for

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its own sake, may be a talent for deciding what needs to be decided. He may make a decision when it is ready, or when it is easy and might as well be got out of the way, or when it is to his advantage to do so. He does not make others which do not need to be made (which is different from deferring decision), which saves a certain amount of wear and tear. But he is evidently quite capable of making decisions when all the circumstances say the act of decision will be most difficult.

Laos was one such situation which came to require decision under pressure. It was on his desk when he



walked into the White House. It had been a major subject of discussion between him and President Eisenhower in their first meeting during the transition, and the major subject of their meeting on January 19, the day before inauguration. Kennedy put a task force to work on the subject. He read the intelligence reports every day and could see that the situation not only was not solving itself but getting worse. He began to ask questions: "We're backing Phoumi – who's for Souvanna? Why not have him on our side? Isn't there any plan except to sit and watch the British wait for a note?" Early in March he called a conference of his government from which there issued some 20 decisions setting military and political measures in motion to support a central decision that the United States should take action. At that point there was no emergency, but the clear prospect that one was developing unless action occurred. Ambassador Thompson was instructed to talk with Khrushchev, Ambassador Stevenson to talk with Gromyko. Then, as the week of March 20 began, Kennedy conducted a review of what had been done, including steps taken to convey to the Soviet Union a sense of the seriousness with which the United States viewed the situation. He then decided it was time to tell the public, time to tell Congress, and time for him to talk with Gromyko (which he did on the 27th). Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara were sent to the Capitol to brief the leadership of Congress and report back on their reaction. He had a press conference scheduled for Wednesday the 22nd, which he moved to the 23rd and into prime time at 6 p.m. He himself decided on the map presentation as the best means of dramatizing what he was talking about. He himself rejected any reference to Laos as a "small country" (it is the world that is small) and spoke of it as "three times the size of Austria." He himself designed and edited his statement to fulfill a prescription of no threats, but clarity and firmness. He rejected the idea of a fireside chat in favor of a press conference at which he could offer "warning and knowledge" to the public.

If that is a history of multiple decisions of first magnitude, it is also, to those who observed it, an example of the Kennedy "ability to live with chaos." That quality can also be observed in domestic affairs. Waiting for Congress to act is almost by definition the art of living with chaos. The strategic decision to discard the enticements of a razzle-dazzle First Hundred Days until Congress had been brought more effectively under the Kennedy influence reflected the same capacity. The deferring of broad federal actions to get at the bedrock problem of the lagging growth rate is another example – a recognition of the "education gap" and "the vote gap" represented by the public's failure to share Kennedy's urgency about the economic gap, and the shortage of Congressional votes to support his proposals for closing it.

But in daily practice, this quality of Kennedy's mind is shown to those around him by the fact that whatever his first inclination may be, he is always ready to listen to "the last person" – provided that person is counted worth listening to – even though what he says may be contrary to a fairly strong first inclination in the Kennedy mind. This suspension of judgment produced a mental picture of Kennedy listening to arguments within his own mind as he listens to a presentation. If he is listening to hard data on a new weapon, he is also listening to inner advice from other parts of his mind about its effect on the budget, its meaning in politics, its influence on relations with allies, and the probable reaction from adversaries. But he does not stop listening to the data, because if the weapon is no good, none of his projections from it mean anything.

This marshaling of related considerations is also what is meant in describing Kennedy's mind as political in the most all-encompassing sense. The whole of politics, in other words, is to such a mind a seamless fabric, in which a handshaking session with a delegation of women is an exercise directly related to hearing a report from a task force on Laos.

The bounds of Presidential concern in the Kennedy government are not yet fixed, but certainly they extend further out and deeper down than usual. It is not at all unusual for him to telephone direct to an assistant desk officer in the State Department – not a desk officer, but an assistant – and put a question. Before hanging up, he tells the officer to let Secretary Rusk know the call was made. The relatively small matters with which Kennedy concerns himself in detail show up time and again in his press conferences. Very recently, for ex-

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ample, he reported the sale of a surplus Navy building in West Virginia to a private firm. The idea was that this was a step in economic redevelopment. It seemed to reporters to be awfully small potatoes for a President to be handling, and there is, indeed, a question whether at some point the expanding boundaries of Presidential interest do not run into the law of diminishing returns.

But it takes only an ordinary knowledge of government to suggest that such broad-ranging Presidential interest notifies every worker, however far out and low down, that he may for all he knows be working within the area of Kennedy's concern, and that he had better give that some consideration. One result is that Kennedy gets to govern the whole government to a new high degree, and therein lies one of the promises that this Presidency might outmatch the permanent residue of wilfulness, stubbornness, lethargy and mere bad habits existing in this and any other bureaucracy.

The Kennedy instinct for the relevant is a quality which perhaps has to be taken on faith, but its existence is unanimously testified to by those who deal with him. If it is a big problem, they see him taking hold of something on the edge that matters, and following it to the center.

But there is no question about his ability to keep problems separate and move from one to the other and back again. To describe him as being seized of a problem would be wrong. When he is working on Problem A and Problem B requires his attention, it does not intrude upon him. He is not distracted. He accomplishes a complete transfer of his mind from one to the other. And when he goes back to Problem A he knows where his place was without a bookmark. The afternoon the Congo crisis boiled up in the United Nations,



Kennedy was engaged in a conference in his office on a supplemental appropriation request, a distinctly complicated piece of business. In the middle of it he got a call from Adlai Stevenson at the UN. He moved from a side chair to his desk – and from one subject to another. After listening to Stevenson a bit, he broke in to ask, without any trimmings: "What about Gizenga? What about his legitimacy?" (An example, by the way, of an instinct for the relevant.) His conversation with Stevenson over, he moved back to his side chair and with a purely pro forma "Where were we?" picked up on the appropriation bill with an immediate series of informed and penetrating questions.

Saturday, March 25, was an extremely busy day for Kennedy. He dispatched a message to President de Gaulle on Laos. He made a quick decision to fly to Palm Beach to see Prime Minister Macmillan. He had conferences on both those subjects and on his meeting with Gromyko on the coming Monday. Forty-five minutes before take-off for Palm Beach, he found himself with nothing to do. Quite evidently dismissing all the other matters from his mind, he set himself at the task of doting i's and crossing t's – and doing some undotting and un-crossing – in a message on oceanography he wished to send to Congress the next week.

Kennedy obviously could not do so much without employing a rigorous order of values and priorities. Not everything a President does is of first importance, and matters of lesser importance must be restricted in the exactions they may make upon him. The appointment of Charles M. Meriwether, of Alabama, as a director of the Export-Import Bank, probably fell within the category of lesser matters in the Kennedy scale. Meriwether's association with political champions of white supremacy in Alabama campaigns kicked up a fuss. There were, on the other hand, orthodox political reasons for the appointment. Kennedy resented the criticism; he was unusually brusque in response to press conference questions about the appointment. It may be justifiably speculated that his resentment resulted not from thin skin, but from a feeling that he had given the matter the consideration it was worth, had exercised in other appointments at each level the appropriate degree of care, had exercised maximum care in those of most vital importance, and ought to be criticized on the total performance, not on one time at bat. On the other hand, the broader philosophical proposition that Southern politicians will never change if national preferment is bestowed on them despite their adherence to rejected ideology does not seem to have played any part in his decision.

The Kennedy mind's inherent intent of action pervades his whole operation. His virtual abolition of the Cabinet as a formal joint council, his abandonment of the formalism of National Security Council meetings and procedures, his excision of committees, his dismantling of the Operations Coordinating Board as an elaborate follow-up instrument for the NSC, were all aimed in some degree at closing the gap between decision and action. He is not interested in statements of the problem that carry no action consequences. The purpose of his conferences is to balance out the general considerations that relate to a course of action. Under him, the NSC is not a place for generating big papers on broad objectives here and there in the world. It is

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a place in which policy is exposed to final discussion, where the President confronts a problem and then finally a decision.

His procedures are high-speed. Pick up the phone and ask McNamara what he thinks. Pick up the phone and ask Rusk what he thinks. Don't wait for them to get a staff report. Ask somebody going by what he thinks, if his opinion is worth anything. Or let him speak up if he has an opinion, and he ought to have, that's his job. If there has to be a conference, call in the people who belong in it and forget the table of organization, the NSC and the Cabinet. Out of an *ad hoc* conference of weight equivalent to the NSC, there recently flowed 17 action memos. These chits, recalling the "Action This Day" memos emitted in torrents by the wartime Churchill, may result from a meeting, or Kennedy may generate them on his own. Dictated to a secretary, they flow through McGeorge Bundy's office. A paper control was hastily established to keep track of them. It amounts to little more than numbering, and distribution of copies to those who "should know," apart from the addressee. They assume action, eliminating the need for ponderous follow-up.

The Kennedy "task force" intends action. It is not, like a study commission, an elaborate means of putting off action. It is focussed on a problem; its activity forms around that problem and the need for action. Kennedy uses them often: On Laos, Cuba, Viet Nam, NATO, minimum wage policy, integration in federal employment, and so on.

Heading a task force on NATO, Dean Acheson was not expected to write a book, but to produce ideas for action. He perhaps found this out the hard way. When he was still two weeks from a final draft of his report, Kennedy began pressing. The result was a rough draft in four days, because it was in the rough draft stage that Kennedy wanted to get aboard. Then there was a conference – McNamara look into this, Rusk write a report on that, let's take this paragraph out because it's not really intelligent. Following the conference there were reviews by the departments. There were injections of Kennedy ideas, and when reports from the departments were received, the report had the form of a list of proposals which, it was remarked, the United States could put down on the NATO Council table the next morning. There is no handsomely-bound Acheson study cluttering the Kennedy desk.

One of the cumulative effects of Kennedy's constellation of mental attributes can be summed up by saying that this is a President who has no advisers. The term is used, even by Kennedy, and will go on being used. The fact is, however, that the highest function of his councillors is to tell him what questions he needs to have the answers to before making a decision. They give judgments, conclusions, opinions, analyses and information, but there is not one who on any occasion is contributing any more than a *part* of the mix of materials from which Kennedy's mind will get a decision.

There were a couple of interesting sidelights, in a recent TV interview, on Kennedy's monopoly of decision. He paid warm compliments to a book, *Presidential Power*, by one of his assistants, Professor Richard E. Neustadt. But with obvious deliberation he stopped short, when asked, of conceding any specific point on which his conduct of the Presidency had been guided by it. Again, paying equally warm compliments to his Council of Economic Advisers, he remarked, "I'm dependent on the Council for their views of what action we should take." The phrase "their views" carries its own notice that those views are only a part of the

material on which Kennedy decides "what action we should take." It is quite evident right now that a host of other considerations, including political realities, go into the mix.

Kennedy's mind is such, indeed, that he tends to advise the "advisers." This happens all the way from minor politics to international affairs. A political aide presenting the pieces of a problem to Kennedy will get back one of his 1-2-3 responses which may mean go ahead as you propose, but will provide reasons for the action which had never occurred to the aide.

Kennedy rejected the implications of the long bilateral negotiations the predecessor Administration had conducted with the Germans on how to get their help in easing the US balance-of-payments problems. (And Douglas Dillon, one of his "advisers" as Secretary of the Treasury, had taken part in those negotiations.) "This is wrong," Kennedy told his "advisers." "It is politically impossible for the Germans to ask their people to give money to the rich Americans. This is a crucial, fundamental imbalance affecting the whole alliance, and it has got to be solved on alliance principles. That's the only way to get acceptance for it among Germans." That approach opened up a wide new assortment of means, which became the basis of fruitful negotiations with the Germans.

The Kennedy mind, at the decision point, seems to close its intake valve and retire within its cranium to be utterly alone with itself, if only for a split second. At that point, it appears to be separated effectively from all the apparatus which has been pouring materials into it. The decision which emerges may run contrary to the weightiest considerations advanced by the associated minds he values the most: From pre-

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Presidential days there are the examples of his entering the Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries; from Presidential days, the most compelling example is the retardation, for political reasons, of an economic program which as an intellectual concept had won his commitment in full.

A second cumulative effect of the properties of the Kennedy mind is to avoid handling of problems within compartments. Decisions made wholly within the Kennedy mind are made within the whole context of government and politics, which is the only place the whole context exists, and where compartmentalization can be avoided. It follows that a pattern of policies thus conceived shows an integration not to be achieved by the most elaborate coordinating mechanism in the government outside the mind.

Kennedy is conscious of, and working on, the problem of how he transmits his power so that it will not be blunted and negated in the government. The expansion of his area of concern, the direct contact with people at all levels of the government, the uprooting of committees, the very speed of his activity, the action memos, are ways of dealing with the problem. He himself has said that one of his methods is to gather as many people as he can and then "stimulate" them.

To close-in students of his Presidency, Kennedy's deliberate generation of rival currents of information and judgment, is a means of transmitting power. In their judgment, Kennedy does not derive an inner satisfaction, such as FDR enjoyed, from setting people at cross purposes. But the means by which he obtains independent perspective through clash of opinion or multiple streams of information are also a means of inducing "productive tension" in the government. That, and the energy Kennedy puts into the government from his own supply, combine as the main propulsive force of this government.

It is also a conscious policy of Kennedy's to make the existing departments and agencies more effective by giving them more responsibility. This is particularly true of the State Department, which in his view has suffered a serious attrition of stature, prestige, and leadership in the public mind in recent years, but it is true of all. It explains Kennedy's observation that while he finds plenary Cabinet sessions a waste of time, the Cabinet will become more than ordinarily important as his Administration goes on.

The capacity of the Kennedy mind to sustain the evident intensity and speed of its activity is a question which obviously interests the public, watching him on television to see whether he looks tired or whether his tongue gets tangled up.

One answer is that busy as he may be, he has more leisure than anyone else working for him in the top echelon. But it may not be wholly a matter of physical stamina. His load will build up like a coral reef, but faster and in larger increments. When he becomes preoccupied with Cuba, Laos will still be on his desk, and when he becomes preoccupied perhaps with Berlin, Cuba will still be on his desk beside Laos. There are only so many hours in a day, and only so much energy in Kennedy. The forecast is that there will have to be a shift in emphasis, with the scope and number of his personal involvements in policy shrinking, although the absolute aggregate mass of policy within his direct concern may not. The men around him now generating ideas will find themselves more and more engaged in managerial tasks relating to activities already under way and stubbornly continuing.

But Kennedy's capacity to sustain action is certainly supported by an extraordinary zest. There is nothing he dislikes more, it is testified, than a nice, orderly day with five appointments neatly spaced. With the first 15 minutes he has free in the morning he subpoenas Robert from the office of Attorney General for a conference in the Presidential office. Then he keeps filling in the gaps in the appointment list until he has guaranteed himself a 12-appointment day of continuous action. A man lacking zest for his job does not deliberately and even joyously fill in gaps in his work load.

The Kennedy mind being what it is, a Kennedy concept of the Presidency has already evolved. It is that the Presidency of the United States is conducted by the President. When he says "we," as he usually does, he means "Me and my mate, the Presidency."

Postscript

As to the role of Mr. Kennedy in connection with the defeated April 17 expedition in Cuba, the point may be made that the event endorses this analysis of the Kennedy mind far more than it might impeach it.

To begin with Kennedy in the Cuban case faced preordained alternatives. A rebel force in being, on the shores of the United States, and by decision other than his own, was a preordained alternative. Its very existence forced a choice between other preordained alternatives: Whether to let it go or not let it go. By no act of Kennedy's, the matter had become, before he took office, one he could not handle in his own way; that is to say, while a policy can be rescinded, an armed force of fervently motivated men, under another flag, cannot.

Second, and perhaps most important of all, there was a failure of information – specifically, accurate information as to the potential of sympathetic internal uprising in Cuba. If an opinion may be ventured, it would seem a pity if Kennedy, on the basis of results in one situation which may literally have defied his best efforts, were yet to change his way of doing things. The carry-over of preordained alternatives on his desk will dwindle with some speed. He must overhaul his feedlines of information. His procedures of decision can then be thoroughly tested in an environment of his mind's own creation.

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The Grim Alternatives

by Herman Kahn

Henry Kissinger's new book is almost equally addressed to the layman, the professional, his close colleagues – friendly and otherwise – and the President of the United States and his Secretaries of Defense and State. The latter three individuals are definitely reported to have already read the book; and presumably most of the others will. In any case it has already made the national best-seller lists.

The Necessity for Choice
by Henry Kissinger
(Harper; $5.50)

It is difficult to write for so wide an audience. Kissinger does extraordinarily well, but many of the minor weaknesses of the book result from his attempt to cover so much for so many (in some cases he is practically conducting a conversation with individual critics). Most readers, however, are likely to be willing to forgive his ambitiousness in admiration of the breadth of the work.

The introductory chapter gives the setting in which the West finds itself in the year 1961. It makes grim, if familiar, reading. But Kissinger's implication that good leadership on the part of the US would have resulted in a far different situation is debatable, however lamentable the actual leadership may have been. After all, the Soviets were bound to increase their power. The liquidation of Western Imperialism went – all things considered – relatively smoothly. The economic vigor of the West –as compared to the gloomy predictions current in the late forties – is astounding. In addition, the line extending from Turkey to Japan has proved amazingly stable.

Conceding all of the above, his gloomy estimate of the current situation, whether it was inevitable or not, seems sound. However, Kissinger does not think of our plight as hopeless:

> "The worst need not happen, however. We can still reverse these trends if we move boldly and with conviction and if we overcome our penchant for choosing the interpretation of current trends which implies least effort. We still have the opportunity to remedy the weakness which must increasingly invite Communist pressures as the missile age develops. NATO can still be revitalized and extended. The North Atlantic group of nations is in a position to take a new initiative leading to some form of confederation. We are still able to contribute a sense of direction to the new nations and to help bring about a political framework that gives meaning to independence and content to our belief in freedom and human dignity."

Yet, if one removes the (necessary and useful) rhetoric from the above statement, one is left with a program that, promising as it is, may still fail to meet the simultaneous challenge of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the arms race. Paradoxically the program also looks too hard to do. Yet, as Kissinger himself says, "If we cannot do all of these things, we will not be able to do any of them."

The next two chapters give a straightforward, competent, and readable account of the theory and practice of deterrence in the sixties. These chapters go over much the same ground that he covered in his earlier book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, this time in a humbler and more cautious tone. They appear much sounder to me than his earlier discussion; but they lack the freshness, intensity and even vitality of the previous work, possibly because the volume of material on this subject has made it more difficult to be outstanding, possibly because one simply can't always be new and exciting. The most startling item is Mr. Kissinger's reappraisal of the role of nuclear weapons in limited war. He comes out for a conventional capability along the lines the Administration seems to be following.

One major criticism of this military discussion is that Kissinger often points out that it is possible that the Soviets will do something in the weapons field and then instead of leaving it as an open question, usually assumes they have done so. One consequence is that he makes the mistake of treating US strategic inferiority in the early sixties as an inevitable reality rather than as a possibility that may or may not occur. Also he never seems to consider explicitly the possibility of our both hedging against the worst eventuality, and being in a position to exploit US good luck or skill, or possible Soviet bad luck or incompetency. Most important of all, he does not really face up to all the implications of a possible stable balance of terror, though he does much better than most other writers have done.

The next five chapters cover newer ground. They are probably the major contribution of the book, and they are a major contribution indeed. He discusses the United States and Europe and the creation of a possible North Atlantic community as one answer to Soviet growth and challenge. This is one of the most important constructive suggestions in the book. Kissinger also has important insights on the difficulties of the West in East-West negotiations that should be required reading for all who are impatient for bold new proposals. He discusses at length the problems and possibilities for arms control, the nature of Communism and totalitarianism in the new nations and the possibility of favorable "natural"

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developments in the Soviet Union and the underdeveloped areas. The things he has to say on these subjects are not only useful, they are an extremely persuasive set of arguments against the typical oversimplification and wishful thinking that mar so much discussion of these problems.

In a final chapter on "The Policy-maker and the Intellectual," he has some very sound and occasionally brilliant things to say about Government planning and the use of intellectuals in this planning. However, this last chapter is somewhat one-sided. It is too kind and respectful to the intellectual to be a fair account of the problems.

Some will undoubtedly criticize Mr. Kissinger for painting such a dim picture of our future. But surely this is not a black mark against Kissinger; he did not make the world. Although I believe our position is probably better in some ways than he paints it – and certainly better than the picture some reviewers have ascribed to Mr. Kissinger – his description is reasonable.

Mr. Kissinger might also be criticized for not giving us more details about what he would have us do to make the world better. After reading *The Necessity for Choice* you will not be able to write your Congressman about the right way to fight or end the cold war.

But, again, this "weakness" cannot fairly be ascribed to Mr. Kissinger. The problems that the world poses today are too complex and too tough to yield to any one man's efforts. No flash of intuitive genius or strategic insight from even so gifted an observer as Mr. Kissinger will enable us to negotiate the road that lies ahead. There is a significant chance that we will not be able to make it at all. But I, at least, believe that our chances are better if we continually – but carefully – make use of hard, serious, professional analysis of security problems. *The Necessity for Choice* is a long step in the direction of helping the American public to be able to use and understand such analysis. This kind of step in the right direction is much to be preferred to the confident formulas which are widely available.

Finally, some will be inclined to criticize Kissinger for being too complex – not in his writing which is admirably lucid – but in his presentation of the dilemmas. I would tend to make the opposite criticism. By sometimes making things seem less complex than they are, by underrating the uncertainties, the varieties of interactions, the great number of relevant issues, Kissinger ends up with a too superficial presentation of the "choice" we must make. In many cases his analysis is such that one conjectures that a modest change of viewpoints, a modest broadening of the scope of the considerations, or even some small changes in the assumptions, could change major conclusions. One has the feeling that the very next book by a competent man, even by one with the same basic viewpoint is going to have drastic and "obvious" changes.

Possibly I am being too harsh in blaming Kissinger for this. But if the current best is not good enough, then the current best is not enough. The problem of national security has become too large and complicated, the dilemmas too acute and irreconcilable for any one man to handle, even one man with the access that Henry Kissinger presumably has to information and the results of analysis of others, in addition to his own ponderings. We need more ideas and better synthesis than our current intellectual and analytical institutions are likely to provide.

However, when Kissinger is compared with his competition he stands out. No one else has written so perceptively of the complete range of political and military problems. In addition to having a profound impact on the professionals, his two books have been important factors in moving the levels of public discussion of politico-strategic issues up several notches – a valuable contribution for which all, even his critics, owe him much.

The Faulkner of the Don

by Herman Singer

Mikhail Sholokhov, author of *Harvest on the Don*, is one of the favorite contemporary novelists in the Soviet Union, his popularity with Stalin, and currently Khrushchev, being equalled only by the genuine affection with which he is held by Russian readers at large. Sholokhov's books sell by the millions in many languages, and he is not only a member of the Supreme Soviet but he has been the recipient of the Orders of Lenin and Stalin. Khrushchev asked Sholokhov to accompany him on his visit to the United States in 1959. Following soon after the Pasternak affair, the selection of Sholokhov was seen as evidence that the Soviet Premier was not indifferent to the claims of literature. About Sholokhov's attitude toward Pasternak, there is contradictory evidence. The present publishers inform their readers that Sholokhov was "one of the few writers to defend Boris Pasternak during the controversy over *Dr. Zhivago*." During Sholokhov's visit to the United States, however, he was quoted as saying that Pasternak's failure to seek him out was more deleterious to Pasternak than to himself. Pasternak, said Sholokhov, was a "hermit crab."

Harvest on the Don
by Mikhail Sholokhov
translated by H. C. Stevens
(Knopf; $5)

Sholokhov's fame has remained undiminished since the publication of *And Quiet Flows the Don* and the companion volume to the present one, *Seeds of Tomorrow*. These books were written by an author who was pictured as independent, by virtue of temperament and income, of the party line, and scornful of the incompetents who have put an ideological vise on the literary output of the country.

Unlike Pasternak, who made few excursions into the political world, Sholokhov has been active on the literary and public scene. He has appeared frequently at conferences, and is available for appearances at the request of Communist Party leaders, who appparently see in their alliance with him a means of identification with an author capable of interesting an audience in

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the Soviet Union and abroad as well.

The success of Sholokhov's works is based on the fact that he has taken the Don area in Southern Russia, his native region, and pictured the impact of the Russian Revolution and the early collectivization program on it. Sholokhov, who still lives in the region, knows the people, their idiosyncracies, superstitions and crudities as well as Faulkner knows Mississippi. To show the impress of revolutionary changes in an area whose people set great store by tradition, and whose ignorance of world events is extensive, demands the literary qualities of a Tolstoy, and there is evidence to suggest that Sholokhov patterned *And Quiet Flows the Don* on *War and Peace.*

There is more than simply literary admiration in this choice. *And Quiet Flows the Don,* which appeared in four volumes from 1928 to 1940, represented the victory of psychological realism, a less rigid forerunner of socialist realism in Soviet literature. Within the framework of the novel of psychological realism, the characters are shown against a background of the historical developments of the period. This was a reaction against the Soviet literary ideologists who felt that the novelist must portray his heroes as prototypes of Communist intransigence, strong, assured and in full possession of the omniscience that Communist leaders embody in making their decisions for the Soviet people.

Psychological realism won the day – and reached its epitome in the Don series of Sholokhov – but in retrospect it seems to have been a transitional phase which was to yield to the full flood of socialist realism, in which the Communist, as conscious Party member, was the ineluctable leader of men.

The psychological realists based themselves on selected Tolstoyan prescriptions for the novel – the protagonists seen against the historical background of their time, their lives spelling out a moral or social message endorsed by the author. This was an improvement over those who had early urged that the new Soviet man must be the hero of the new Soviet novel. This latter theory was to flower in the thousands of socialist realist novels, a morass out of which Soviet writing has only recently begun to climb, spurred to some extent by such novels as Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago* and Tertz' *The Trial Begins,* which cannot be published in the Soviet Union.

Not only Tolstoy's theories motivated Sholokhov; in his novels there is an almost literal attempt to emulate *War and Peace.* Since Sholokhov is hardly the master of style, nor does he have the grasp of history or insight into character of Tolstoy, these comparisons cannot be carried too far.

What characterizes Sholokhov's novels is a persistent vulgarity, in the best and worst sense. The Cossacks of the Don are earthy, rude, superstitious, courageous, and faithful to their traditional code of life. These values come through with continuous impact in the Don novels. Sholokhov has obviously attempted to create the epic of the Don and its inhabitants.

And Quiet Flows the Don is Sholokhov at his best. There is an attempt to present a wide panorama of the First World War, the Revolution and the Civil War. The close-knit village, which supplies the major characters of *And Quiet Flows the Don* is battered by the forces that convulsed Russia during the period. There is an admirable interplay of people and period, and there is no doubt that the Tolstoyan model has been most usefully applied by Sholokhov in his novels. There is, however, an extra element that Tolstoy, even at his most didactic, did not include in his works.

Sholokhov lacks the brilliant artlessness and the psychological intuition of Tolstoy, and there is a mechanical undercurrent as he presents the waves of change in novelistic form. Unless the translations are badly at fault – and so distinguished a critic as Professor Marc Slonim, though making the charge of unwarranted cutting, seems satisfied with their fidelity – in great stretches of the Don works there is more than a suggestion of Margaret Mitchell and of Upton Sinclair in the Budd series.

What undermines the impact of Sholokhov's novels are the segments of Communist dogmatism, introduced crudely and pointlessly, at various points in the narrative. Whether out of conviction – Sholokhov had joined the Communist Party in 1920, when he was fifteen – or as a reaction to guidance from above, these interludes add a party spirit to his works which dispels the picture of Sholokhov as a free creative figure.

This insertion of literal Communist doctrine leads to some curious anachronisms in *And Quiet Flows the Don.* Thus, even before the Revolution, Stockman, who is identified as a member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, is already depicted as the dedicated Bolshevik, possessor of the key to understanding all situations, and implacable oracle of the future. So pervasive is Stockman's talent that one of the Don Cossacks in the village in which Stockman spent some time can conjure up his memory to pierce the veil of forthcoming events: "If a clash had to come with anybody, it must be with Kornilov; yet it must not be in favor of Kerensky, not for his government, but for the one which would arise after him."

The inclusion of such passages, presaging the subsequent victory of socialist realist doctrines, does not dissipate the novel's raw sweep of vigorous power. Yet the characterizations remain without depth, and it almost appears that Sholokhov, admiring the elemental passions of his Don people, cannot quite bring himself to understand them. Isaac Babel's *Red Cavalry,* a book of sketches of Budyenny's Cossack regiments in action during the Civil War, is more incisive than Sholokhov's portrayal of an entire village.

These political intrusions, inserted from a narrowly partisan base on behalf of the Communist line, are frequent irritations in *And Quiet Flows*

"IT WAS A HAPPY *chance that Chesterton lived before the era of television. His gifts, his amiability, his very simple eccentricities would have tempted him to become one of the great performers on that damning machine. He lived on the edge of the chasm. Living today his words would be lost, his prestige prodigious and his renown brief.*" (*Evelyn Waugh, writing in our Spring Book Issue.*)

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the Don. In *Harvest on the Don,* the Party line is much more obtrusive, and because the novel covers the period of collectivization, with its horrible toll in human life, there is less excuse for the portrayal of forced collectivization as a bucolic jaunt into agricultural change. As Sholokhov depicts it, the Don Cossacks were reluctant to accept the upheaval in their traditional way of life, but in the end, as gruff but honest husbandmen, they saw the advantages of the Communist program, and put up good-naturedly with the errors of the stiff Communist organizer, Davidov, sent from the outside to speed up the attainment of party targets. Davidov's weaknesses, including an affair with the local Carmen, are overlooked because at heart the villagers know that he carries the seeds of the happiest possible future for the Cossacks of the Gremyachy Log collective.

The political tension revolves about the plan of Ostrovnov, manager of the collective farm, to participate in an anti-Soviet rebellion led by a number of counter-revolutionaries who live in Ostrovnov's house. Davidov is killed in arresting the leaders of the abortive rebellion. The episode is somewhat unconvincing, particularly since the conspirators seem to belong to an earlier era, nostalgic for a restoration of Whites in the Soviet Union.

Because *Harvest on the Don* took twenty years to complete, there have been rumors to the effect that Sholokhov was wrestling with Soviet advisers who opposed the author's original plan to have Davidov commit suicide following his arrest by the GPU. In another version, Davidov was apparently scheduled to be arrested as a deviationist during the purges of the thirties. Since Sholokhov has publicly declared that the version as printed is faithful to the original, there is little choice but to consider the novel on its own terms.

Harvest on the Don, closer to our time than *And Quiet Flows the Don,* is more sectarian politically, and less spacious. Where, in *And Quiet Flows the Don,* Sholokhov could contrast the pre-revolutionary scene with the civil war and peace, in *Harvest on the Don,* the limitations of writing about a more contemporary problem with Soviet censorship in mind makes it impossible for Sholokhov to deal in any penetrating way with the impact of collectivization on the free Cossacks. The characters, shown in all their human grossness and impetuosity of feeling, are the same in all the novels; at times they are almost caricatures, similar to those found in some of Erskine Caldwell's stories of Southern tale-spinners.

Sholokhov's works are apparently less dogmatic than most contemporary novels in the Soviet Union. It nevertheless is a cause for despair that Russian readers who, under earlier Soviet auspices, had access to works by Babel, Mayakovsky, Pasternak, Zamiatin and Zoschchenko, among others, are forced to make do today with Sholokhov as the outstanding talent which Soviet publishing makes available to them.

War Lord in Spite of Himself

by Leonard B. Phillips

It was the fate of Newton D. Baker to become a consummate war lord as Secretary of War from 1916 to 1921. Baker hoped for a career teaching history, but wanting opportunity, turned to the bar. Satisfying his law course requirements at Washington and Lee in a single year, he returned to Martinsburg until 1899, when he joined a law firm in Cleveland. There he soon attracted the attention of Mayor Tom Johnson, the millionaire-turned-progressive who was admired by Lincoln Steffens as the finest local official in America. Baker became one of Johnson's "happy reformers" as city solicitor in 1901, and succeeded Johnson as mayor in 1911. 15 years in city government confirmed in practice Baker's faith in Jeffersonian concepts, and his belief in the desirability and appropriateness of reform through local processes. It also gave him opportunity to perfect himself as an orator, an art in which none of his contemporaries was ever able to surpass him.

Newton D. Baker
A Biography by C. H. Cramer
(World; $6)

His command of language became gracious and sure; and whether his forum was a Congressional Committee, political rally, or the Supreme Court, his speeches were adorned with references to history, literature and the classics, and delivered extemporaneously at the rate of 225 well chosen words to the minute. It was in a single speech at the Democratic National Convention of 1912 that Baker helped influence the Presidential nomination in Wilson's favor and make himself a national figure. Offered a cabinet post in reward, he chose to serve out his term as mayor. He had barely resumed the practice of law when Wilson insisted that he become Secretary of War.

When he took office the General Staff in Washington consisted of fewer than a score of officers, the army itself of less than a hundred thousand men. The nation had hirtherto depended on volunteers for its armies, and when war came the proposal of a draft was received with contempt and derision, one congressman shouting that blood would flow in the streets if conscription were attempted, another describing "conscript" and "convict" as synonymous. The task of constructing cantonments for the new army eclipsed the ten year Panama Canal project in magnitude. No concrete plans for military operations outside national borders existed, and placing an army of sufficient size to make an impact on the Western Front by 1918 involved such logistical difficulties as to make them seem insurmountable.

Over these enterprises Baker presided with unperturbed calm and 16 daily hours of hard work. Adept at delegating authority and ingenious in enlisting the zeal of others, he gave John J. Pershing, his field commander in France, and Peyton C. March, his Chief of Staff in Washington, firm support and a free hand. He saved direct attention for those matters to which he could make special contribution, and to him personally belongs much credit for conscription, war finance, military

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morale and health, and for boldly construing restrictive legislation so as to enable the general staff to operate efficiently. In 1918 an army of nearly two million was successfully landed in France, and another two million were under arms when the Armistice came.

Baker was the mildest of men. Preoccupied from youth with the problems of education in democracy, he found the mark of education in manners, and saw no reason why manners should be forsaken in politics. He believed public figures ought in a true sense to be teachers, and above all teach by example. If ever was brought a disposition "lovely in private life" into the service and conduct of the commonwealth," that disposition was Baker's. But in such service it was his lot to endure the harshest of abuse. The famous "Newtie Cootie" cartoon references to his five-foot-seven frame and his history of past associations, with pacifist causes were typical of the wartime indignities he bore in silence.

His approach to politics was intellectual and philosophical, and he relished neither the contention of campaigning nor the pomp of public office. Clevelanders knew their mayor as an inconspicuous figure in the back seat of a streetcar with his nose buried in a book. In appearances during the war the crowd often ignored him and gaped with incredulity when it was pointed out that the curious little man in the peculiar high-crowned hat was the Secretary of War.

He returned to the law in 1921, regarding his experience in Washington as a prolonged nightmare which had left him at 50 "completely worked out," with his health impaired, $8,000 worth of debts to pay, and a family to provide for, and the firm resolve never again to leave Cleveland for the sacrifice of national office. His skill as an advocate during the 16 remaining years of his life was still to merit Justice Holmes opinion that Baker was the outstanding member of the bar in his generation.

Though a private lawyer, Baker remained a public figure. His was an influential and unique voice as he asserted his freedom to say what he pleased in the manner he chose. His name was the most distinguished of those offered for the Presidential nomination at the Democratic Conventions of 1924, 1928, and 1932. But he did nothing to further his candidacy for President or any other office, elective or appointive. His public deportment, on the contrary, seemed by design to impair his prospects.

In standing for US entry into the League and other internationalist causes designed to promote world peace when such a stand was unpopular and such causes neglected, Baker probably made the contribution for which his memory will be most cherished. The seeds planted in receptive minds by the speeches and letters of the man who believed that in a democracy the result when the votes were counted was less important than the message of the campaign, have begun to reach harvest. In this lies the fulfillment of his boyhood desire to teach.

Relying on extensive private correspondence, C. H. Cramer has now written the first biography, a welcome addition to Frederick Palmer's 1931 study of Baker's war activity. In analyzing Baker's views on the specific issues arising over 30 years of changing circumstances, Mr. Cramer capably accepts a difficult challenge. His short, fast-moving play of men and events, evolving in light reflected from an intellectual backdrop results in a gratifying book. Forewarned that even as a student Baker nourished on Burke's *Politics*, and came to consider it the greatest political philosophy since Plato's, we may listen with perspective as the older Baker, considering an offer for the Presidency of the University of Virginia, describes himself as tempted to "occupy the pulpit of Thomas Jefferson," the American he revered above all others. Cramer's book enables us to see with equal clarity both the ardent Progressive of youth and the reluctant Democrat of maturity, and see them as one.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Herman Kahn's *book,* On Thermonuclear War, *has provoked a world-wide controversy.* Herman Singer *is a contributing editor of* Dissent. Leonard B. Phillips *is a New York attorney.*

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
SO I WAS SITTING IN THE DARK FEELING VERY RESPONSIBLE BECAUSE WHEN THE SIRENS SOUNDED I OBEYED THE LAW AND TOOK SHELTER - WHEN I REALIZED WE HAD BEEN THERE FOR AN AWFULLY LONG TIME. "THE ALL CLEAR MUST CERTAINLY HAVE SOUNDED BY NOW," SOME PEOPLE SAID.
SO WE FIGURED OUT THE TIME AND IT HAD BEEN OVER FOUR HOURS. SOME OF THE CROWD WANTED TO GO OUT ON THE STREET BUT I'VE ALWAYS BEEN A NATURAL LEADER SO I TOOK CHARGE AND SAID -
"WE TOOK SHELTER BECAUSE THE LAW TOLD US TO. IF WE LEAVE OUR SHELTER BEFORE THE LAW TELLS US TO, WE'RE AS BAD AS THOSE PEOPLE SITTING OUT IN THE PARK WHO INSIST THIS WHOLE BUSINESS IS INSANE."
EVERYONE AGREED THAT WE CERTAINLY WANTED TO STAY WITHIN THE LAW. CALM WAS RESTORED. AFTER TWO MORE HOURS WENT BY, A NERVOUS MOTHER SAID - "LISTEN, I'M SURE I HEAR SOME MOVEMENT OUT THERE! MAYBE THE SIREN HAS BROKEN."
"YES," CRIED EVERYONE. "THE SIREN MUST HAVE BROKEN!" BUT ONCE MORE I BROUGHT LOGIC TO THE SCENE.
I SAID, "THE LAW SAYS WE MUST WAIT FOR THE SIREN. IF WE LEAVE BEFORE WE HEAR THE SIREN EVEN IF IT IS BROKEN WE'RE AS BAD AS THOSE PEOPLE SITTING OUT IN THE PARK WHO INSIST THIS WHOLE BUSINESS IS INSANE."
IT'S BEEN THREE DAYS NOW AND THOSE WHO ARE STILL CONSCIOUS ARE BEGINNING TO STIR. PRETTY SOON I'LL HAVE TO SPEAK UP AGAIN.
WITHOUT PROPER RESPECT FOR THE LAW, SOCIETY MUST CRUMBLE.
4-30
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ART

A Private Collection On Display

Most of us think of the National Gallery in Washington as a good gray place – although it's really rose-white – where are preserved important art gifts to the nation and where hordes of tourists can grab a bit of culture and a bit of air-conditioning between the old bones of the Smithsonian and the shaftsmanship of the Washington Monument. The relative lack of changing, temporary exhibitions is chalked up to the principle that if you already have it, you don't have to borrow it: the permanent collections of the Gallery are sufficient unto themselves. So it may once have been; if it was, a change has taken place and the change will never be more in evidence than in the next year or so, when the Gallery will be staging top flight temporary shows of such importance as the Chinese art and objets from the Imperial Palace Collection now on Formosa, a big Winslow Homer show and the Tiepolo drawings from the Victoria and Albert Museum in London.

Leading off this series of spectaculars is the exhibition now at the Gallery, the Marie and Averell Harriman Collection. This, too, represents a new policy at the National, for while museums all over the country, including the Metropolitan, have always shown important private collections whenever they could, the National never has – except, of course, when private had become public by way of gift to the Gallery. The Harriman show is the first of a projected series, one a year, of top American private collections. Presumably the ultimate aim is to bind a whole new set of collectors to the Gallery with hoops of steel, but in the meantime the enterprise provides all of us with a good view of a lot of art worth viewing.

The Harrimans have a good bit of early American stuff, some of which they patriotically gave for use in the Governor's Mansion at Albany only to have seven of the pictures badly burned for their pains. The collection as such, however, and as shown at the National Gallery, is right down the main road of French painting from the late 18th Century to the early years of the 20th, with two important additions, a large group of paintings by the old Fauve, André Derain and another group by Walt Kuhn.

In time, the collection begins with a magnificent Chardin still life that establishes the impassioned elegance that characterizes all the French pictures. There are also a couple of good Courbets, but things really begin to happen with the five or so Cézannes in the show. One is an astonishing waterside landscape, in which the reflections of the buildings seem as substantial as the originals as both are transmuted into the artist's own structure of paint. There is a Mont Ste. Victoire that gets all the looming bulk of the terrain feature that so fascinated Cézanne by means that seem absurdly simple: a few lines, a few planes, a very few colors, large stretches of empty space, yet from it all towers the massive bulk of the mountain and the lush plain beneath. In addition to a small portrait and a still life, the Harrimans' Cézanne group also has an open air scene of four couples coupling that is one of the best of his nudes in the sunlight pictures.

From Cézanne the collection proceeds through a series of waterworks. The single Van Gogh is a bowl of white roses against a green background that is hysterical in its acid green and in the flux of the green's manner of application; the roses themselves, in the strokes composing their petals, take on the edgy quality of the background.

Gauguin is represented by two pictures, examples which between them sum up a good deal of the man's achievement. One is a Brittany Landscape of 1890 in which the fields fall deeply away to meet a distant sky while in the foreground, almost like an Art Nouveau frieze, a cow-girl and her cows pass flat against the depths. The

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other picture is one of the great works from Tahiti, dated two years later, "Words of the Devil." Now all is flat. The nude brown girl stands, reflective and perhaps afraid beside the swirl of stylized waves, before the haunted jungle. Shapes appear in the jungle and one, the head of a serpent, arches out of the darkness. Seated behind the girl, another woman stares out, not at but through, the spectator. A chilling work, that shows, like all the south seas stuff, that Gauguin was concerned with a hell of a lot more than flat planes and artistic arrangements.

This parade of masterpieces of French painting culminates in two of the most famous Picassos: the 1905 "Lady with a Fan," in which the blue figure sits as if a priestess or even a goddess, her eyes entranced, her figure hieratic, hand raised, fan lowered, face in light, a person from daily life suddenly seen under the species of eternity; and a 1922 "Mother and Child," in which the artist, briefly out of Cubism and all that, let his marvelously flowing line describe the two figures with a minimum of painterly means.

Throughout this main section of the Harriman pictures, the interest has been not in the names, all of whom are received into the canon of saints, but in the individual items, which reveal a wonderfully sure taste – and well they might, for the Marie Harriman Gallery, in New York, was, from 1930 to 1942, one of the key American sources for French painting of the glorious epoch. At this point, however, with Dérain and Kuhn, a different interest comes to life, the interest in the man, not undiscovered certainly, but certainly unappreciated in the way of the rest.


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Dérain, with Vlaminck and eventually Matisse, early passed into the mythology of modern art as one of the founders of Fauvism, a short-lived phenomenon in the first six or so years of the century. Unfortunately Dérain lived on for another fifty years and the general view has been that after the Fauve, nothing, or at least not much. The Harriman holdings explode the view completely. His later pictures are much more fully satisfactory than his Fauve pictures ever were, although at the time no doubt they were exciting. But the later development is toward the classical aims of painting and the achievement of those aims is very high, especially in two ambitious still-life works.

Walt Kuhn is the only American in the collection and he doesn't look at all like a weak hanger-on. His strength comes through like an express train, especially in the two most important Kuhns in the Harriman group, a monumental "White Clown" and an architectural "Green Apples." He speaks, in his context, for American patient honesty as against French elegance and he makes the one seem just as important as the other.

FRANK GETLEIN

THEATER

The Lesson of the Moiseyev

After witnessing a thrilling program of dance by Moscow's Moiseyev Company the other night, I was pressed by an anxious crowd into the lurid phantasmagoria of Times Square, where I stopped to observe the local attractions. Ads for movies called *Geisha*

The Moiseyev Dance Company
Metropolitan Opera House

Playmates, Virgin Sacrifice, and *Woman Bait* were graphically displayed on the pornographic marquees of 42nd Street grind houses. Fatuous situation comedies blared from blinding TV sets in dark, gloomy bars. From loud speakers above record shops floated the hollow moan of teen-age crooners, wailing in echo chambers about the tortures of frustrated love. In front of dance halls, strollers were examining glossy photos of peroxide girls in the full ebb of defeated sexuality. And on the side streets, over-dressed Broadway audiences were exhaustedly emerging from gaudy musical fantasies celebrating the triumph of money over mind. Is it by some sinister design that the Moiseyev troupe has been installed at the Met, just a stone's throw from these rotting citadels of our degenerate mass arts? Is it mere coincidence that the first thing a spectator encounters, after admiring the bursting health and vital animal exuberance of the Soviet dancers, is the general deadness of life and desperation of spirit among the masses of this grim metropolis? Whatever the motive, the effect is disheartening: the simple geographical placement of the Moiseyev troupe, next to the soulless American diversions, evokes comparisons which make us reek of decay.

In a sense, such comparisons are somewhat invidious, since it is doubtful if Moiseyev dance is typical of Russian mass culture – which I suspect is pretty much as dreary as ours. For one thing, the company is too accomplished; for another, the evening, though full of fervent patriotic pride, is almost totally free from tendency or propaganda. Aside from an occasional wooing scene, in fact, the dances contain hardly any programmatic content at all, not even in the famous partisans sequence, where one expects a chauvinistic tribute to Russia's gallant resistance to Nazi aggression, but gets instead a series of fiercely beautiful sword dances and horsemanlike maneuvers, performed in voluminous Cossack cloaks. Leaning heavily toward the abstract, the entire repertoire of the Moiseyev seems like an open affront to Soviet realism, if not to Soviet unity. The company performs regional folk dances from the various Soviet Republics, each executed through grace-

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ful glides, formal monograms, swirling turns, wild abandoned leaps, occasional acrobatics, and even (in a dance-cum-balancing act from Uzbekistan called "The Platter") a touch of local vaudeville. Clearly, this is not the usual Soviet mash, flavored by the stale gravy of political didacticism. The appeal of the Moiseyev can be found rather in its extraordinary precision, virtuosity, and energy, and above all, in its bubbling, wholesome, infectious good nature.

Yet, we must inevitably compare the Moiseyev with our own mass art, because its program is so clearly designed as popular entertainment, and not as high culture. One would like to measure the work of this troupe against the more profound creations of Martha Graham or George Balanchine, but its ambitions are much too modest. Communist totalitarianism has effectively suppressed that individual freedom essential to serious art and the choreography of Igor Moiseyev, like most Soviet creative expressions, is without psychological depth, a tragic sense of life, intellectual and spiritual content – in short, the qualities we usually associate with the finest Western dance. (It is also free of the major defect of so much American choreography, namely that obsessive sexual emphasis, chorus-boy effeminacy, and slick sophistication.) But then the function of the Moiseyev is quite simple and unpretentious. The company is content merely to celebrate community differences within the Soviet, communicating – through a kind of transcendent joyousness and virility – the deepest energies of the various Russian peoples. That these energies remain so triumphantly vital suggests that, despite Soviet meddling with most forms of expression, the ethnic cultural diversity of Russia has somehow been preserved, and with it, the art of the folk which prevents a people from becoming a mass.

It is a fact tinged with irony and melancholy that here – where cultural freedom has no real enemy but the profit motive – this naïve, rich, direct expression of the people has petrified and died, as the people themselves have begun to stiffen, turning to lumpen stone before the Medusa-head of uniformity. The death of a genuine people's art is

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heralded by the pseudo-folksy guitar strumming of the Greenwich Village bohemians, but the mass media pay for the funeral, graciously supplying cemetery plot, headstone, and gravediggers. Observers less apologetic toward democratic culture than sanguine sociologists have yet to measure how severely our degraded mass arts have degraded our masses, but the coarsening of both is sufficiently obvious to the Moiseyev company which concludes its program with a hair-raising parody of American teenage dance. To watch these vigorous men and apple-cheeked girls – who have just been demonstrating their perfect discipline, dignity, and agility – collapse into the absurd postures of American adolescents, their faces going slack, their behinds protruding obscenely, their lips wrapped loosely around dangling cigarettes, their gaudily costumed bodies plastered together and swaying narcotically to the idiotic rhythms of rock-and-roll, is to see the tragedy of our culture enacted in scarifying terms. But then one needs only walk a few steps up from the Met to see this tragedy even more horribly confirmed.

For let there be no mistake about it: the culture of a people is not just a reflection of their aesthetic taste, but an accurate index of their hearts and minds. And the American mass arts – now manipulated solely by profiteers and salesmen – shamefully display to all the world the devitalization of the American masses. "We had fed the heart on fantasies," wrote Yeats, "the heart's grown brutal from the fare." The brutalization of the people's hearts by the fantasies of mass culture is something for which no amount of social or economic progress can provide much comfort, for it signifies the systematic deterioration of the American spirit. To judge from the Moiseyev company, the Russian spirit is still vibrant and vital, despite the deadening weight of totalitarianism, and the Russian heart is still pulsing with life. What, then, is the lesson to be learned from this rich dividend from the cultural exchange? It is that we must somehow unmassify our people and their culture if either is to live again.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Television and the Profit Motive

Sirs:

In his article on journalism (April 24) Karl Meyer lists four devices by which one can avoid judgment while seeming to express one. May I add a fifth: failure to draw the obvious conclusion. This device is well illustrated by John Cogley's article in the same issue on the failure of television's news and information services to show a sense of public responsibility.

Mr. Cogley asks: "How can television be *The New York Times*, Harvard University and the Outdoor Advertising Company all at the same time?" He then points out that the members of the television and advertising industries are not, as individuals, irresponsible persons; they are no better or no worse than the rest of us. The flaw seems to lie in the nature of television as an institution, or, more precisely, as Cogley quoting Day admits, in the fact that the basic function of television as it is now organized is to make money.

Mr. Cogley then fails to draw the obvious conclusion. He seems to approve of the fact that Mr. Day has no argument with the profit motive. This is strange because Cogley's whole article is an indictment of the profit motive in television. His solution is to appeal to the television industry's sense of professional responsibility; but since when have institutional defects been eliminated by appeals to responsibility?

If I may be presumptuous, the obvious conclusion is either that there ought to be a publicly owned and operated television network which is not based on the profit motive, or that the desire for profits ought not be made contingent upon the good will of advertisers as would be the case in pay television.

Charles Landesman Jr.
Lawrence, Kansas

On Restricting Competition

Sirs:

"Competition," can indeed "be effectively restricted in industries characterized by a fairly large number of sellers without conspiracy," as Mr. Richard Barber says in his "Other Kinds of Price Fixing" (April 24). Who said it couldn't I did not, although Mr. Barber says I did. Where?

In articles, books and addresses, I have argued for 20 years much as Mr. Barber does on the question of corporate sizes and efficiencies. Over a longer period of time changes may indeed evolve but his statement "... means can be found for increasing the number of firms in those markets now accurately described as oligopolistic ..." is a wholly academic projection. Business concerns do not come into existence that way, that is, by "finding means" to increase their number. I am a businessman.

I do not assume, as Mr. Barber charges that "the only solution is wage and price regulation." On the contrary, I suppose in the very article

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upon which he comments that we adopt a graduated income tax with higher rates on larger profits to discourage undue bigness. Both of my proposals are more practical than any possible government effort to "call for a division of the firm's assets, looking to the creation of many, new, independent entities as would be consistent with optimum efficiency."

T. K. Quinn
Largo, Florida

Unanimity at *The National Review*

Sirs:

I am much intrigued by the reference, in your "Correspondence" of 10 April, to the "opinion . . . of 95 percent of the staff of *The National Review*." The tacit premise here would seem to be that there is division of opinion in the staff of *National Review*, and, at a second remove, that such a thing would conceivably be tolerated at 150 East 35th street. Now: as any reader of Adorno et al.'s work on the authoritarian personality ought to know (and I should have thought, judging from the footnotes in the contemporary output of the social scientists, that all literate persons were readers of Adorno et al.), this is nonsense. It is clearly understood by all of us at *National Review* that William F. Buckley, Jr. does our thinking for us on all matters; nor, so long as staff-members in the lower echelons and, of course, our readers, show us a comparable deference, would any of us wish it otherwise.

Willmoore Kendall
Madrid, Spain

The Folksong Fad

Sirs:

The Nancy Lynch letter (April 17) about folk-singing was too much for this music lover to take lying down. The current collegiate passion for "Bluegrass and country" music is an indication of how square the current generation has become. The former generation dug the sounds of a Benny Goodman, of Artie Shaw, of Glenn Miller, of Tommy Dorsey – music that was vigorous, imaginative and fun. It was part of the history of Jazz, the *real* American folk music, at once as stimulating as it is creative.

The current folk music fad is a great hoax. 99 percent of the music is basic and banal.

John Lissner
New York, N. Y.

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THE
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Here Is Our Stand on Cuba

Carleton Beals (Nov. 12, 1960)

"There is nothing to hope for from either Presidential candidate. Nixon upholds the present punitive policy and seeks the overthrow of Castro, even if he disagrees with Kennedy's wild proposals to promote revolution in Cuba. . . . Our cold war against Castro is losing us the battle for all the neutral and independent new countries of the world."

Editorial (Nov. 19, 1960)

"On a recent visit to Guatemala, Dr. Ronald Hilton was told that . . . the CIA has acquired a large tract of land . . . being used as a training ground for Cuban revolutionaries who are preparing for an eventual landing in Cuba."

Editorial (Dec. 3, 1960)

"After a speech before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Inspector General of the CIA and second in command to Allen W. Dulles, a member of the audience addressed the speaker: 'Professor Hilton says it will be a black day for Latin America and the United States if [an attack on Cuba] takes place. Is this true?' After a long silence, Mr. Kirkpatrick replied: 'It will be a black day if we are found out.'"

Don Dwiggins (Jan. 7, 1961)

"I was able to confirm the report that first appeared in a *Nation* editorial to the effect that a military base actually exists behind the green curtain of Retalhuleu (in Guatemala)."

Editorial (Jan. 14, 1961)

"As a nation, we are not good at cloak - and - dagger activities, as events in Laos and the U-2 incident should remind us. The fact that we are not adept does us credit as a people. Cloak-and-dagger operations do not comport well with traditional American values or with the national character."

Editorial (Jan. 21, 1961)

"The notion that this country is planning an actual invasion of Cuba is, by common assumption, 'preposterous.' Why, then, does Castro insist that an invasion is imminent? . . . Castro himself points the finger at Washington; he would make a better case if he pointed at Miami. . . . Fighter pilots . . . are recruited locally and flown to a mysterious air base in Guatemala. . . . Within a hundred feet of a main intersection in downtown Miami, with police prowl cars making regular rounds, exuberant refugees toss their rifles in the air and boast that the next stop will be Pinar del Rio, and then Havana."

Ronald Hilton (April 29, 1961)

"The United States will almost certainly emerge from the current situation with a tarnished reputation. . . . Our equivocations have unquestionably reduced our prestige throughout the world. For this we must thank the power elite in New York and Washington which really runs the affairs of this country."

Editorial (May 6, 1961)

"*The Nation* urges Mr. Kennedy to stay out of Cuba, to cease intervention of any kind. Let the 'commando' groups be disbanded. Instruct the Attorney General to enforce the neutrality laws. Padlock the cloak-and-dagger 'spooks' at the CIA. Avoid a blockade. . . . Any further violence on the part of the American government, whether by subornation or directly, will be a disaster for the United States and, before history, for Mr. Kennedy himself."

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—Kingsley Martin,
***New Statesman*, April 21, 1961**

"After a trip to Guatemala [Dr. Ronald Hilton], described in the October, 1960, issue of . . . *Hispanic American Report* his discovery that the CIA had acquired and developed . . . a large tract of land at Retalhuleu, Guatemala. There they were training anti-Castro recruits. This startling and important intelligence went unnoticed by all the major newspapers and press services. It was left to *The Nation* . . . to give the story wider circulation in its issue of November 19, 1960 — that is, five months ago."

—Charles Collingwood,
WCBS TV, April 23, 1961

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